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ABSTRACT

The legislators of the Second United States House of
Representatives faced a set of challenging military and political
problems when they met in November 1791.

The issue of what would

be the primary means of the young nation's defense had not yet
been determined.

The old British and colonial precedents of a

militia as the first line of defense were firmly rooted in the
minds of the most congressmen meeting in Philadelphia.

Many of

the legislators had been indelibly imprinted with a fear of a
large standing army in peacetime from their own personal
experiences in the pre-Revolutionary days.

Many of those who

would become stalwarts of the Republican Party in later years
felt that a militia, while often militarily ineffective,
preserved the republican virtues on which the nation depended for
its moral underpinnings.

Others, who were usually in the ranks

of the future Federalist party, felt that a well-trained regular
federal force was the only practical military solution for the
nation's long-term needs, barring vast improvements in the
training and discipline of the state militia forces.
Underlying both considerations by the members of the Second
Congress was the pressing need for a military solution of some
sort in the Northwest Territory.

With a series of military

embarrassments suffered at the hands of the frontier Indian
tribes, the issue of how best to achieve military respectability
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took its place alongside other important matters in the Second
Congress.

Occurring also at this time was the emergence of

factions that would later evolve into two distinct and
antagonistic political parties.
Aside from the standard methods of research, such as
examining the debates of Congress and studying newspapers and
documents of the time, I used the Rice-Beyle cluster bloc
analysis technique to discover the existence of congressional
voting patterns.

This method examines the voting behavior of

paired congressmen to determine similar voting behavior.

I

separated the roll calls dealing with the issues of a stronger,
reorganized militia from those pertaining to a more potent
regular army for use on the frontier and analyzed both sets of
data for voting patterns.

I also examined the voting patterns

for all 102 roll calls of this Congress.

In the end, I

discovered that smaller groups of legislators than I expected
voted together consistently on military issues, while voting in
opposing factions on the overall business of the House.
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INTRODUCTION

Whenever the militia comes to an end, or is despised or
neglected, I shall consider this union dissolved, and the
liberties of North America lost forever.
John Adams, 1823.1
Among the numerous proposals faced by the First Session of
the Second Congress was the Uniform Militia Act.

In its final

form, this act required "that each and every free able-bodied
white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein,
who

is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the

age of forty-five years,

(except as hereinafter excepted) shall

severally, and respectively, be enrolled in the Militia by the
Captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds
such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after
the passing of this act."2 Finally approved on May 8, 1792, the
bill provided what little federal guidance the state militia were
to receive for over a century.3
The passage of the Uniform Militia Act came over two years
after Secretary of War Henry Knox proposed his original plan for
a universal militia for American male citizenry.

In Knox's plan

of January 1790 the militia of the country were to be classed
into three categories, according to their ages.
classes were:

The three

an advanced corps of men aged 18 to 20; a main

corps of men 21 to 45; and a reserved corps of men 46 to 60.

In

this overly ambitious plan, each young male would have to
participate in periodic militia training in order to be eligible
1

2

to vote, hold office, or exercise legal rights.

Also, the

federal government would provide the men with all arms,
equipment, and clothing. The act did not specify what groups or
persons would be exempted from the provisions of this compulsory
military service.

It was

prohibitively expensive for a nation

as young as the United States.4 According to Richard H. Kohn,
one of the leading historians of the military during the
Federalist period, "the administration purposely phrased its
recommendations in exaggerated forms in hope that after the
inevitable debates and compromises in Congress, the final
legislation would retain those provisions necessary to transform
the militia into a viable institution.1,5 This rather devious
political scheming seems unlikely, but whether or not this was
the underlying motive of Washington and Knox, the much-modified
plan that Congress ultimately approved in 1792 bore little
resemblance to Knox's original outline for the militia.
One basis for much of the debate concerning the role of the
militia during this period was a traditional fear of a standing
army. The preference for local defense goes back not only to
American colonial times, but as far back as the time of Alfred
the Great in England itself.

Although the British model for

militia service proved more popular in its idealized form than
when put into actual application, the concept of a defensive
force composed of the average yeomanry retained its appeal when
transplanted to

the American colonies.6 Early settlers

migrating to this land from England also brought with them bitter
memories of the later Stuart years and the abuses of a standing
army.7

3

The experiences of Americans in the years prior to the
Revolution did nothing to persuade them of the need for a heavily
armed garrison in major population centers.

Samuel Adams, the

patriot and rabble-rouser, stated in 1768:
It is a very improbable supposition that any people
can long remain free, with a strong military power in the
very heart of their country. . . .
Even where there is a necessity of the military power,
within the land, which by the way but rarely happens, a wise
and prudent people will always have a watchful & a jealous
eye over it; for the maxims and rules of the army, are
essentially different from the genius of a free people, and
the laws of a free government.8
Thus, to those who feared the trampling of civil liberties by a
dangerous standing army, a system of state militia seemed the
safest path.

As religious, legal, and economic institutions were

adapted from British practice, so too were military institutions.
Having the same history and culture as the mother country, it was
natural for the ex-British colonies to continue the British
militia custom.
From the early days of the republic, concern for military
security was an important consideration.

After ridding

themselves of British rule, the new nation's builders set out to
enumerate the citizens with a census, an undertaking with
military implications. Not only were over three million citizens
to be counted for purposes of representation and taxation, but
also they were being counted for their potential role in
defending the

country.

According to Carroll D. Wright, the act

approved March 1, 1790, required the census marshals gathering
data "to distinguish the sex and color of free persons and free
males of 16 years and upward from those under that age; in the
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latter case, undoubtedly, for the purpose of ascertaining the
military and industrial strength of the country."9
A complicating factor at work in the establishment of a
military plan for the new country was that of state versus
federal authority.

To the Federalists, who favored a strong

central government, the weakness of the state militia tended to
make the country itself weak.

Leading Federalists like Alexander

Hamilton cited the unpreparedness of the state militia during
Shays's Rebellion as evidence of the danger of lack of central
control of the military.

However, Antifederalists were confident

that the militia could handle most military situations capably
enough, citing the performance of militia at the battles of
Lexington, Bunker's Hill, and Saratoga as proof of militia
prowess.

In fact, "Antifederalists interpreted the militia

provision [of the Constitution] as an attack on state power, an
attempt to undercut the states by lodging the basis of
sovereignty, the purse and the sword, in the national
government."10
While the First and Second Congresses wrangled over such
issues as establishing a United States bank, a mint, and a post
office, the matter of a nationally regulated militia languished
on the floor of Congress.

The committee of the First Congress in

charge of making Knox's militia proposal workable took five
months to create a bill, and when it did appear in July 1790 it
resembled Knox's original plan only in that it still contained
provisions for a select corps of militia.

From July 1790 until

November 1791 the militia bill rarely emerged from committee, as
Congress was absorbed by matters that seemed more pressing at the
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time, such as Hamilton's financial programs.

However, action on

the Uniform Militia Act accelerated with news in December 1791 of
the St. Clair defeat.

The utter rout of Arthur St. Clair's

poorly trained troops, composed in large part of militia, shocked
Congress and spurred interest in the Uniform Militia Act, which
had been gathering dust in committee.11 With only 500 of the
1,400 men in General St. Clair's army escaping unharmed from an
Indian ambush, public pressure to improve the military posture of
the country suddenly and not surprisingly increased.12
In a flurry of activity Congress began to investigate St.
Clair's defeat, and began to consider more seriously earlier
legislative proposals that now seemed suddenly relevant.
Congressional attention was directed toward two major measures.
In addition to the Uniform Militia Act, the Congress also had
before it an "Act for making further and more effectual provision
for the protection of the Frontiers" (the Five-Regiment Bill), an
act which would significantly increase the strength of the
regular forces arrayed against the Indians.13
The Uniform Militia Act cannot be considered apart from the
Five-Regiment Bill.

This is true not only because of their

proximity on the legislative agenda, but also because of the
differing philosophies the bills represent on military matters.
For some congressmen, the notion of a sturdy militia was the
foundation of the nation's military strength.

For others, more

pragmatic in their outlook, the key to the nation's strength lay
in having a well-trained regular military force that could endure
extended campaigning.

The debates over each bill served to bring

out the merits of both points of view, and provided a forum for
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the concerns of many legislators over the country's military
future.
During the debates over the bills to increase the regular
army and to solidify the militia into a national force, the
incipient partisanship that had been brewing in the early
Congress began to solidify.

To the southerners and westerners

who were against Federalist taxation and financial programs, the
military disasters in the West were a good opportunity to
embarrass the Federalist administration and accuse it of plotting
the introduction of a standing army.

For example, early

dissenters took the chance to expose Federalist military bumbling
by launching a Congressional inquiry into the St. Clair fiasco.
However, the opposition was also embarrassed, because it could
not present a solid front against the Five-Regiment Bill.
Frontier districts in the South and West were quick to demand
that their representatives in Congress provide actual protection
against the very real Indian threat on their frontier.

Even

James Madison, already a leading opponent of Federalist policies,
could not oppose the Five Regiment Bill because of his home
state's exposed frontier.14

Sectional and partisan concerns thus

played against each other throughout the debates concerning the
funding of the nation's growing military.

During an April 1792

vote on a "bill to raise a further sum of money for the
protection of the frontiers" by increasing the duty on imported
hemp and cordage and placing a duty on imported cotton,
representatives split along sectional lines.

Southern

congressmen would vote for a bill that protected southern cotton,
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while Northern congressmen would not vote to raise revenue for
the increasing military if the bill seemed to favor the South.15
When the Uniform Militia Act finally came to a vote in the
House in March 1792, the bill had been emasculated considerably.
It had no administrative structure to assure training and
compliance with national standards, nor did it provide for fines
for noncompliance with the act.

Gone also was any sign of Knox's

system of classing men into age groups.

Pressure from several

interest groups had resulted in the bill being reduced in scope
and strength. Many tradesmen resented the classing aspect of the
bill, which could take young apprentices far from their trades
for long periods of time.

Quakers resented the lack of

exemptions on religious grounds.

Individual states felt that any

federally imposed system of fines for failure to muster would be
an infringement on their rights as self-governing units.

The act

as finally passed was so inoffensive and vague in its language
that it provided a mere skeleton for the operation of state
militia.16
And yet, for all its weakness, the bill established the
principle that all able-bodied men owed their government military
service, that they must be trained to provide that service
efficiently, and that in event of war the United States intended
to fight with a mass citizen army.

As a policy the act was a

failure; but it was a policy that had far-reaching ideological
implications for the nation.

It reflected, surely, an influence

of the French Revolution, as well as British history and colonial
experience.
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According to Richard H. Kohn, the weakness of the Uniform
Militia Act played into the hands of those Federalists who
desired a strong national military establishment.

Although

Russell Weigley views the passage of the Uniform Militia Act as a
major foundation of American military policy until the twentieth
century, Kohn sees it differently.17

In Kohn's words:

When the first session of the Second Congress
adjourned in early summer 1792, the United States had
crossed a watershed in the development of its military
institutions. Congress had created the first effective
peacetime army and, in the Uniform Militia Act, had dealt a
crushing blow to an already dying militia system.18
During the remainder of this study, I will examine the
motives of the men who hammered out the significant military
legislation of the Second Congress, both those who favored it in
its final form and those opposed it.

I will determine their

attitudes from a study of the Annals of Congress, in which their
debates appear, in contemporary newspapers, in other primary
materials, and in their biographies.

Most importantly, I will

examine the Journals of the House of Representatives, which
indicate how each Representative voted on every issue that came
to a roll call.

Occasionally it will be found that one who said

yea in debate, said nay when he cast his vote.

My hypothesis is

that the men of the Second Congress cast their votes on military
issues in roughly the same pattern they displayed on other
issues, with the exception that the members were more likely to
display parochial or personal attitudes on military issues than
they may have on such issues as funding the debt or establishing
the post office.
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CHAPTER ONE:

BIBLIOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

The subject of the early American nation's political
development has received extensive treatment by historians.

The

political nature of the infant nation's militia development,
however, has not received the sort of attention it merits by
historians of the period.

Possibly this is due to the

unglamorous nature of the militia issue when compared to more
exciting matters at hand in the early Congresses, such as uneasy
relationships with European powers and establishment of
precedent-setting governmental policies such as funding the
national debt or establishing the national bank.

Occasional open

warfare that flared on the frontier between settlers and Indians
as the frontier advanced made the militia issue seem rather
unspectacular.

While these and other easily identifiable issues

are dealt with at length by general histories of the Federalist
period, the argument over what was to be the role of the state
militia in the defense of the country has generally received
short shrift in the studies of the era.

With a couple of notable

exceptions, historians have usually slighted the admittedly
unevenly performing militia forces of the period in favor of
detailing the more concrete and easily explained feats of the
regular army troops of the day.
Two historians who have effectively covered the issue of the
militia's status in the developing nation are John K. Mahon and
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Richard H. Kohn.

Kohn, in his thorough Eagle and Sword:

The

Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in
America. 1783-1802, details the issues of state versus federal
control of the military, military and frontier difficulties, and
political considerations entering into congressional military
decisions.

Kohn covers the combination of factors leading up to

the passage of the Uniform Militia Act more completely than any
other historian.

He suggests that the strong Federalist support

of the act was a roundabout effort to subvert the existing state
militia systems by diluting the effectiveness of the militias;
this seems a bit excessive.

However, Kohn makes a plausible case

elsewhere in his work for the strong conspiratorial atmosphere of
the Federalist period, with emphasis on the Newburgh conspiracy
and Hamilton's suspiciously enlarged and politically
discriminatory 1798 army.1
John K. Mahon's The American Militia:

Decade of Decision.

1789-1800. while not as extensive or as speculative as Kohn's
opus, covers the atrophy of the American militia system in an
adequate, if brief, manner.2 Mahon details the roundabout
journey of the Uniform Militia Act from committee to committee
until its ultimate emasculation.

He notes especially the damage

done by the omission of a select corps of ready militia in the
bill's final form.3 Mahon is also one of the very few historians
who attempt to document the aftermath of the Uniform Militia Act
by delving into its operation in individual states.

He concludes

that the bill received uneven enforcement in different states,
varying in vigor according to the needs and inclination of those
states' administrations.4

12

Another historian who covers the issue of militia in the
Federalist period is Lawrence Delbert Cress.
Arms:

His Citizens in

The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of

1812. although emphasizing political philosophies at the time
regarding military matters, gives an interesting account of how
British radical Whig philosophers influenced the leading American
thinkers of the day, imbuing them with the notion of the
militia's purity of spirit as opposed to the evils of a standing
army. Cress shows that such British thinkers as James Harrington,
John Trenchard, and David Hume had a direct effect on Jefferson,
Madison, and others who later adopted the Republican Party as
their instrument to contest the threatened infringements on
citizens' liberties posed by Hamilton's Federalists.5
For source material on the period under consideration, the
Annals of the Congress of the United States and the Journal of
the House of Representatives were invaluable.6 The Annals of
Congress were especially useful since they provided coverage of
the debates on military affairs that took place on the floor of
the House.

Although the procedural verbiage of the legislators

often took time to decipher, the florid and often passionate
diatribes by congressmen in defense of their respective points of
view on military issues were illuminating and even entertaining.
Since at this time the Senate debated in secret, the proceedings
of that body provided very little insight into what Senators
thought on issues.

The Journals, while short on the

give-and-take of debates, furnished a useful double-check on roll
calls and dates.
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Useful in providing background into the general period of
the 1790's were some of the newspapers of the day.

The Boston

Gazette carried especially good coverage of the Indian problems
on the frontier, much of which was reprinted from the frontier
newspapers of the time.

Helpful in illustrating the nascent

political polarization of the country were the Federalist United
States Gazette (Philadelphia) and the Republican General
Advertiser (also of Philadelphia). While these politically
oriented newspapers dealt heatedly at times with the alleged
despotism of the opposing party and covered a variety of foreign
and domestic topics, occasionally a reference could be found to
militia or army issues.
Another valuable primary source was the American State
Papers, a collection of various government documents and
correspondence between public officials.7 Especially interesting
were the Indian Affairs and Military Affairs series of these
papers.

Secretary of War Knox's correspondence with President

Washington and others was particularly engrossing as Knox tried
to puzzle out the militia issue and the Indian situation on the
frontier.

Slightly disappointing was the Miscellaneous portion

of the American State Papers; this section was full of random, if
not trivial, government documents that dealt little with military
matters.
Of the secondary works not mentioned already that deal with
military matters during the Federalist period, what is striking
is the number of major works that either touch only briefly on
the militia issue, or which dismiss the militia as a military
embarrassment.

Most military historians discuss the failures of
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Josiah Harmar and St. Clair when speaking of military matters
during the Federalist era, as well as the militarily minor
Whiskey Rebellion, and, inevitably, Anthony Wayne's triumph at
Fallen Timbers when speaking of military matters during the
Federalist era.

Most do not, however, deal with the issue of the

citizen soldier as a perceived counter to the prospective threat
of an overly aggressive central government, as do Kohn and Cress.
The military historian, perhaps naturally, seems to deal with
that which is concrete and observable, while the political
historian may delve more into what lies in men's hearts and
minds.
Of the major military historians of the period, only Russell
F. Weigley, in his Towards an American Army:

Military Thought

from Washington to Marshall, tries to address the issue of the
militia as a political football.8 Weigley discusses the currents
of military thought that led to the passage of the Uniform
Militia Act, finally concluding, as does Kohn, that the bill
ultimately strengthened the arguments of those favoring a regular
army.

Interestingly, in his History of the United States Army,

an extensive survey of the country's entire military history,
Weigley discusses the militia issue more tersely, concentrating
on the Frontier Bill, which added to the power of the regular
army.9
Warren W. Hassler, in With Shield and Sword:

American

Military Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present, deals with the
militia only sketchily, as does Francis P. Prucha in his
otherwise excellent The Sword of the Republic:

The United States

Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846.10 William H. Guthman, in his
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March to Massacre:

A History of the First Seven Years of the

United States Army, 1784-1791, dwells on the inadequacies of the
militia in early campaigns rather than on any potential
contributions they may have made.11 James Ripley Jacobs, in his
galloping The Beginnings of the U. S. Army:

1783-1812, lays the

fault for the failure of the militia in the St. Clair campaign on
the senior and intermediate officers who led them, rather than
the men themselves.12 Jacobs eventually concludes, as do most
military historians, that only regular army troops had the
discipline to sustain a lengthy campaign against the Indians.13
Works that do not contribute greatly to an original
perspective on the militia issue, but which provide valuable
background on the problem, include Don Higginbotham's George
Washington and the American Military Tradition, which
reemphasizes Washington's oft-noted suspicion of the militia's
staying power, and James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A
Respectable Army:

The Military Origins of the Republic,

1763-1789.14 Two works that provide useful background in the
pre-Revolutionary militia are John Shy's Toward Lexington:

The

Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution
and Fred Anderson's A People's Army:

Massachusetts Soldiers and

Society in the Seven Years' War. Anderson's work especially
points out the personal commitment of the individual militiaman
and the privations endured by him.15
Unusual among those writing about the Uniform Militia Act is
Jim Dan Hill.

In The Minuteman in Peace and War, he sees the

1792 act as providing a manpower reserve for use in crises.16
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Unlike most historians, who see the Uniform Militia Act as a
waste of effort and the militia as generally inefficient, Hill
takes a kinder view of the subject.
much as a

Hill views the act not so

piece of legislation intended for vigorous enforcement

as "a military manpower bookkeeping arrangement with functions
more comparable to those of the modern Selective service than to
functional combat Companies, Regiments, Brigades, and Divisions
in being."17 Hill's charitable view of both the Uniform Militia
Act and the militia in general may have been due to his extensive
personal involvement in the National Guard and his experience as
a major general called for duty in World War II.
Three works which explore the relationship of the American
civilian to the concept of armed service are The Civilian and the
Military, by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.; Soldiers and Civilians:

The

Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865, by Marcus Cunliffe; and
American Democracy and Military Power:

A Study of Civil Control

of the Military Power in the United States, by Louis Smith.18 Of
the three, Smith most directly addresses the question of the role
of the citizen in military service, and notes that the Second
Amendment was obsolescent almost as soon as it was ratified.
Smith also observes how the original plans of Madison and others
for the states to act as a military check to the excesses of the
federal government have become obsolete.

Cunliffe advances the

idea that the Uniform Militia Act worked in tandem with the
Second Amendment to maintain a measure of state control over the
militia, although both measures were strangely inefficient
militarily.
For general works of the period John C. Miller's The
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Federalist Era:

1789-1801 is very good in explaining the

financial and political dilemmas facing the new nation, but does
not mention the militia as a political issue.

Miller only

briefly mentions the St. Clair disaster and deals mostly with the
regular army when discussing the tensions with France later in
the period.19 Forrest McDonald's The Presidency of George
Washington slights the militia issue as well, but gives a lively
perspective on the political workings of the Washington
administration.

Especially interesting is McDonald's apparent

suggestion that, while Washington was not a dupe of Hamilton, he
was an occasionally bemused bystander while the government was
being established.20
For those who think that history is biography, several
individual biographies of the leading figures of the Federalist
period are available.

While most of these biographies shed only

a partial light on why these figures voted as they did on
particular issues, they serve to provide background on the makeup
and motivations of these men.
Gerry:

The best of these are Elbridge

Founding Father and Republican Statesman, by George A.

Billias; Fisher Ames:

Federalist and Statesman, 1758-1808. by

Winfred E. A. Bernhard; and Evolution of a Federalist:

William

Loughton Smith of Charleston, 1758-1812. by George C. Rogers,
Jr.21 Anthony Wavne:

Soldier of the Early Republic, by Paul

David Nelson, gives a good account of Wayne's military exploits
during the Revolution and his command of the Legion of the United
States, but does not adequately explore Wayne's political career
as a congressman, particularly his role in the passage of key
military legislation.22

The personal writings of Jefferson,
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Madison, and especially Hamilton were helpful in obtaining
insight into the attitudes and concerns of these principal
figures of the period.23
Irving Brant's James Madison:

Father of the Constitution,

1787-1800 gives a good account of Madison's role in the eventual
ratification of the Constitution and his willingness to
compromise on the militia issue for national harmony, but little
is said about Madison's later support of the militia as a bulwark
against federal encroachment of civil liberties.24
Bill of Rights:

In his The

Its Origin and Meaning, Brant does not provide

extensive coverage of the Second Amendment, with its protection
of state militia from federal prohibitions, concentrating instead
on Madison's more pressing concern with the freedoms of religion,
press, and speech than on the right to bear arms.25

Possibly

Brant's writing these works when the issue of gun control was not
at fever pitch has something to do with the lack of coverage of
this issue.
Good discussions of early American political party
development can be found in Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The
Jeffersonian Republicans:

The Formation of Party Organization,

1789-1801, and Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System:
The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States.
1780-1840,26 Cunningham charts the voting record of members of
the House of Representatives on key issues during the First
Session of the Second Congress and also compares members' voting
patterns with James Madison's voting record.

Although done

manually, Cunningham's work is valuable in attempting to chart
the incipient shift toward partisan politics.27

Another work

19

that

provides insight into the rise of political parties is

Joseph Charles's The Origins of the American Party System:

Three

Essays. Charles attempts to analyze the personal characteristics
which motivated Hamilton's quest for power.28
Of the articles dealing with military issues during the
Federalist period, the best is Frederick Bernays Wiener's "The
Militia Clause of the Constitution," which summarizes the history
of the militia from post-Revolutionary days to its incarnation as
the National Guard at the turn of the twentieth century.29 Wiener
examines the legal problems involved in the federal use of state
troops, noting that the "Calling Forth Act" was implemented only
once, during the Whiskey Rebellion, before being superseded in
1795 by legislation that did not oblige the President to rely
upon notification from a particular official before using state
troops to quell rebellion.30
Another article, more general in scope but interesting as
philosophical background of the period, is Marshall Smelser's
"The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion."31

Smelser debunks

the notion that the principal figures of the times were the
wholly rational marble gods they are often pictured as today.
Smelser makes a case that "the political activity of the
Federalist period was strongly influenced by the passions of
hate, anger, and fear."32
In addition to using the standard source material mentioned
above, I have also used quantitative analysis in examining the
defense-related business of the Second Congress.

This

quantitative analysis takes the form of computerized roll-call
research, using Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis to explore
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groupings of congressmen who voted together.

The advantage of

the Rice-Beyle method of analysis is that, by looking at the
voting record of congressmen in a particular Congress, it ensures
a place of importance for those obscure members who did not
appear in the Annals of Congress with the regularity of a man
like Madison.

Unlike the standard methods of research, which

often emphasize those public figures who made the most noise,
cluster-bloc analysis permits the weight of numbers to be
accounted for in examining the history of a particular congress.
For my examination of the defense-related roll calls of the
Second Congress, Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis served its
purpose well.

This method compares the voting record of each

member with that of every other member.

The amount of similarity

in voting behavior appears in sets of pair-wise combinations that
are plotted on a matrix as well as in column percentages of
agreement.33

For this Congress, I have chosen the standard

seventy percent as the level of agreement between members
necessary to belong to a certain bloc.

To be a member of that

bloc's fringe, a congressman must have voted with at least fifty
percent of that bloc's members, at a minimum of seventy percent
of the time.
The Second Congress, 1791-1793, set many precedents in the
fields of government finance, foreign affairs, and in the conduct
of the nation's military policy.

With the clamor for and against

military action on the frontier, and the problem of how to
integrate the country's militia forces into the national defense
establishment, some legislation on these problems was inevitable.
The Frontier Bill, which enlarged the regular army by three
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regiments for action against Indian tribes, was the consequence
of the first problem mentioned.

The Uniform Militia Act of 1792,

which provided for a nominally codified system of state militia
throughout the country, was the eventual product of the latter
concern.

Therefore, for my roll call analysis, I chose the

eleven defense-related votes which were most important to these
issues.

I split these eleven roll calls into two groups for

analysis.

Six roll calls dealt with votes on the militia issue,

while the other five concerned a stronger, more expensive
frontier army.

These roll calls are discussed in Appendix A.

The results of Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis of the votes
mentioned produced somewhat smaller blocs of members than I had
originally hoped.

For one thing, the Second Congress consisted

of a maximum of seventy-two members, seven of whom were excluded
from analysis in the Frontier and Militia groupings due to an
insufficient voting record on these issues.

This brings the

members under consideration down to sixty-five, not a huge number
of congressmen.

Also, and perhaps most importantly, the era of

high party development had not yet come to fruition in the
country during this time.

Congressmen were not yet in the

lockstep of voting like automatons according to the dictates of
their party leaders, as they would be by the end of the 1790s.
Congressmen were more likely at this time to vote according
to their personal beliefs or sectional interests than toe a party
line.

Rudolf M. Bell, who has analyzed voting patterns of the

early Congresses, also makes this observation.34

Despite the

relatively small number of members in the Second Congress, it
still produced a voting bloc of sixteen members who voted
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consistently in support of the administration's militia policies
These were regularly opposed by a bloc of ten members who hailed
largely from Virginia and North Carolina.

The existence of such

groupings, even in a period of such low party development,
illustrates the utility of Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO:

THE MILITARY SETTING FOR CONGRESS

To understand why the Second Congress passed the Uniform
Militia Act of 1792 we must first examine the background in which
the legislators operated.

To pacify the tribes on the nation's

northwest frontier, President Washington sent former
Revolutionary War general and then Governor of the Northwest
Territory Arthur St. Clair into what is now Indiana to
demonstrate the nation's military power.

St. Clair, however, had

a poorly trained and equipped force that numbered only about 1400
men, many of whom had no practical experience in soldiering.

The

army sent against the Indians was too hastily gathered to receive
proper discipline and training, and departed far too late in the
season to mount an effective campaign.

Also, the militia who

participated in the campaign were by and large not accustomed to
an extended campaign, and the federal troops hastily recruited
were not paid much more than a survival wage.

As a result,

morale and discipline on the march were constant problems.

On

November 4, 1791, General St. Clair's forces on the western
frontier were completely routed by a coalition of Indian tribes.1
The stunning defeat of the bulk of United States land forces in
existence at that time aroused indignation and astonishment among
congressmen and ordinary citizens alike.
happened?

How had such a thing

What could be done to prevent a reoccurrence?2
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With the conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783 the
fledgling United States of America was faced with the
administration of thousands of square miles of the newly acquired
Northwest Territory.

This land had been acquired by the British

from the French at the end of the French and Indian War in 1763
and had in turn passed into the control of the Americans in 1783
as part of the peace settlement in the Treaty of Paris between
Great Britain and America.

French and British administration of

these lands had differed significantly from what was to be the
effective policy of the United States.

Rather than the desultory

white intrusion into Indian lands by trappers and traders that
characterized the British and French approach, the Americans
began to advance with the intent of permanently settling in what
were Indian hunting areas.

The Indians of these areas were not

slow to realize the consequences of such encroachments, and
sought to halt the loss of their way of life.

From the friction

arising from the relentless enlargement of American possessions
was to come a situation requiring military and political
decisions.

The new nation could not advance unimpeded through

Indian territory.
The British and French had always sought to avoid
unnecessary intrusion into Indian affairs, a largess due mainly
to their desire to preserve the existing fur trade with the
tribes.

While the fur trade was also important to the newly

land-rich United States, just as important were the settlement
and sale of these new lands.

Proceeds from the sale of the

public domain would be useful in establishing the new republic on
a sound financial basis.

However, as William H. Guthman remarks,

28

"Unfortunately, this same land was the hunting ground of the
powerful Western Confederacy of Indian tribes, including the
Wyandots, Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, and
Potawatomi."3
With the advance of hordes of settlers both west and south,
inevitable conflicts with the native peoples began to develop.
Newspapers of the day gave lurid accounts of frontier settlers
massacred by the "insatiable rovers of the wilderness."4 The
overextended regular army on the frontier could not possibly
cover the broad range of territory it was now responsible for
protecting.

Despite Secretary of War Knox's policy of

conciliation with the Indian tribes, and the army's attempts to
curtail the avalanche of squatters into the territories, tension
continued to increase on the frontier.

Particularly in the

Northwest and in Kentucky, the sheer volume of white settlers
served to make frontier violence a certainty; this was especially
likely because the Indian tribes native to those regions were
more aggressive in protecting their lands than those elsewhere.5
With a flood of reports of frontier atrocities before
Congress, Knox felt compelled to take offensive action against
the Northwest tribes.6 Accordingly, in September 1790 General
Josiah Harmar mounted an expedition against the Miami villages in
Ohio with a mixed force of 1,133 militia and 320 regulars.

The

goal of the expedition was to destroy the Indian towns on the
Maumee as well as to deal a crushing blow to the Indian will to
wage war on the frontier.

Unfortunately, the poor performance of

the Kentucky and Pennsylvania militia during the campaign,
coupled with an inopportune division of the troops by Harmar
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himself, doomed the expedition to failure.

With losses of 75

regulars killed and 3 wounded, and 108 dead militia and 28
wounded, Harmar's defeat was so stunning that Knox ordered a
board of inquiry.7 Harmar was eventually exonerated by the
board.

His defense, which the board clearly accepted, was based

on the alleged cowardly

performance of the militia under his

command.8 However, Michael S. Warner makes the point that
although the militia accompanying Harmar on his campaign were
generally decrepit in appearance and equipment, the heavy
casualties suffered by them during some of the campaign's most
severe fighting belies their usual designation as cowards.
All in all, the ultimate result of Harmar's campaign was the
reverse of what had been intended.

Rather than overawing the

Indian tribes of the Northwest, this demonstration of the
apparent weakness and ineptitude of the United States military
served to embolden the Indians and made the frontier an even more
frightening place to reside for those bold enough to venture
there.

Indeed, when the tribes of the Western Confederacy saw

what had been intended by the United States military, they were
even less inclined to make peace with the whites than before.9
The resort to military expeditions to force the Indians into
submission was by no means unopposed in the public forums of the
day. Wrote one impassioned reader to the Boston Gazette in
September 1791:
I contend the Indians are right in defending their
lands, and committing depredations on inhabitants that use
them with savage barbarity. It is owing to the
ill-treatment they have received from the settlers, that the
present hostilities have commenced. Indians have been
m
u
r
d
e
r
e
d with impunity in the very face of treaties, by the
most abandoned of villains, and no jury could be found
virtuous enough to convict the monsters.10
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Later that same year a correspondent noted in the same newspaper
that "Indians must have some provocation to those acts of
barbarity, and were those complaints published and circulated
among us, perhaps their conduct might appear more like
retaliation, than a mere wanton disposition to murder and
plunder."u

A writer in the Philadelphia General Advertiser

expressed the opinion in early 1792 that a war with the Indians
was not only immoral, but expensive and impractical as well.
Besides warning of the sacrifice of public credit, this writer
went on to warn that "above all we have like the British
attempted with hired troops to subdue a people who are determined
to be free, are animated with revenge, and convinced of the
justice of their cause; and no doubt from these considerations
are determined to defend themselves to the last extremity.''12
An interesting contributor to early American newspapers at
this time was the Indian peace chief Cornplanter, or Cornplant,
as some called him.

In published letters to the governor of

Pennsylvania, Cornplanter countered talk "of the robberies and
murders committed by the Indians" by relating how his own people
were robbed by white men on several occasions.13 One of his more
notable correspondences came with President Washington himself,
who replied that the murders of Indians by whites would be
punished, Indian land would be protected, and treaties would be
honored.

This would prove difficult without adequate military

force to control not only Indians, but the frontiersmen as
well--as the story of Indian relations over the next hundred
years was to prove.

Moreover, Washington went on to say that the

Miami tribes would be forced by U. S. troops to ensure peace,
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which, considering the failure of the St. Clair and Harnar
expeditions, must have seemed doubtful to Cornplanter.

To

Cornplanter's insistence that the Indian chiefs who signed the
Treaty of Ft. Stanwix (a treaty concluded with the Five Nations
at the end of the Revolution) were signing away such a huge tract
of land, Washington firmly asserted that all parties involved in
the treaty knew exactly what they were doing at the time.

With

Washington's assurances of fair dealing in the future,
Cornplanter and his fellow Seneca chiefs returned in peace to
their homes.14
However, one official who had expressed grave reservations
about the country's direction in Indian matters was Henry Knox
himself.

In a report to President Washington dated June 15,

1789, long before the military disasters, Knox warned that:
It is highly probable, that by a conciliatory system,
the expense of managing the said Indians, and attaching them
to the United States for the next ensuing period of fifty
years, may, on an average, cost 15,000 dollars annually.
A system of coercion and oppression, pursued from time
to time, for the same period, as the convenience of the
United States might dictate, would probably amount to a much
greater sum of money; but the blood and injustice which
would stain the character of the nation, would be beyond all
pecuniary calculation.15
While troubled by the notion of the United States becoming a
nation of aggressive land-grabbers, Knox did not rule out the
acquisition of Indian lands altogether:
The Indians, being the prior occupants, possess the
right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by
their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a
just war. To dispossess them on any other principle, would
be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and
of that distributive justice which is the glory of a
nation.16
The irony of the new republic waging an apparent war of
conquest against the native Americans was not lost on everyone.

32

To some it seemed that the troubles in the Indian countryprovided an excuse for national expansion, even a cover for
imperialistic schemes on the British plan.

In February 1792 "An

Observer" sent the Philadelphia General Advertiser these dire
comments:
Could the late Congress when they commenced this war,
like the patriotic Congress of 1775, with confidence appeal
to the Ruler of the Universe for the purity of their
intention, and the avarice and ambition of their enemies,
No: they have reversed the picture, and by becoming
oppressors, have obliged their adversaries to be the
assertors of liberty; they have sent troops into the Indian
country, to commit depredations, worse perhaps than the
British committed in this country; and in so doing they have
given occasion to the friends of freedom, in every quarter
of the globe, to lament that the very people, who were the
first to defend their own rights, and establish equal
liberty, have been among the first to invade the rights of
others.17
During President Washington's address to the opening session
of the Second Congress on October 25, 1791, he enumerated several
issues faced by the previous session of Congress.
Washington's words:

In

"Among the most important of these is the

defense and security of the western frontiers."18 After briefly
noting the failure of treaties in pacifying all Indian tribes,
Washington revealed that "Offensive operations have therefore
been directed, to be conducted, however, as consistently as
possible with the dictates of humanity.

Some of these have been

crowned with full success, and others are yet depending fsicl .1,19
Ironically, Washington made this last statement only two weeks
before the St. Clair disaster on the frontier.
Before addressing other problems then at hand for the new
Congress, such as roads, the post office, the mint, and weights
and measures, Washington suggested a detailed solution to the
Indian problem:
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It is sincerely to be desired, that all need of
coercion in future may cease; and that an intimate
intercourse may succeed, calculated to advance the happiness
of the Indians, and to attach them firmly to the United
States.
In order to do this, it seems necessary-That they should experience the benefits of an
impartial disposition of justice.
That the mode of alienating their lands, the main
source of discontent and war, should be so defined and
regulated as to obviate imposition, and, as far as may be
practicable, controversy concerning the reality and extent
of the alienations which are made.
That commerce with them should be promoted under
regulations tending to secure an equitable deportment
towards them, and that such rational experiments should be
made, for imparting to them the blessings of civilization,
as may from time to time suit their condition.20
Washington concluded on the Indian subject with this bit of
eighteenth-century reasoning:
A system corresponding with the mild principles of
religion and philanthropy towards an unenlightened race of
men, whose happiness materially depends on the conduct of
the United States, would be as honorable to the national
character as conformable to the dictates of sound policy.21
In reply to the President's address, a committee of the
Second Congress, headed by James Madison, agreed in particular
with his statements concerning "the safety of our Western
frontiers, in which the lives and repose of so many of our
fellow-citizens are involved."22 Madison and the others also
praised the "gallantry and good conduct of the militia" whose
service on the frontier was "an honorable confirmation of the
efficacy of that precious resource of a free State."

In briefly

praising the efforts of General Charles Scott and his Kentucky
militia, Washington, during his address to Congress, had
recognized the virtues of the militia, even as the fate of St.
Clair's expedition was still unknown.

He thereby provided

opponents of a standing army, such as Madison, an opportunity to
make a brief case for the virtues of the militia without
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unnecessarily embarrassing the President.

Every member of

Congress knew of the failure of Harmar the year before, although
the fate of St. Clair's army was still pending.

The members of

the reply committee went on to express hopes for the success of
the new expedition, and wished that it would "leave the United
States free to pursue the most benevolent policy towards the
unhappy and deluded race of people in our neighborhood."23
The expedition of Brigadier General Charles Scott to which
both Washington and Madison referred proved an interesting
exception to the generally unsuccessful use of militia against
the Wabash Indians that preceded and followed it.

Whereas Harmar

and St. Clair lived to regret the employment of militia against
the western tribes, Scott and James Wilkinson enjoyed successful
raids against these Indians because of superior tactics and more
careful selection of the troops involved.

After a peace mission

by Thomas Procter had met predictable failure, Knox instructed
Scott to make two raids on the Indian towns on the Wea River.
Scott's force was expected to intimidate the Indians into a
peaceful settlement by a show of force.24
Before setting out on his mission, General Scott carefully
chose 750 Kentucky horsemen from the volunteer militia available.
These men were experienced Indian fighters and were accustomed to
the hardships of the wilderness, as opposed to the raw recruits
of the Harmar and St. Clair campaigns.

Moving swiftly and

changing direction often in order to avoid detection or ambush by
his Indian adversaries, Scott and his men struck deep into the
Wabash territory.

Utilizing hit-and-run tactics they had

borrowed from the Indians themselves, Scott's men inflicted
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casualties of thirty-two killed while sustaining only five
wounded of their own. Although the crops and villages they burned
were not enough incentive for the Indians to abandon frontier
raids, Scott's men had shown that it was possible for a
fast-moving volunteer force to advance with success into Indian
territory and return intact.

A similar expedition led by

Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant Wilkinson achieved lesser results,
but still came away from the Wabash area with its unit integrity
complete.25 After his own campaign's conclusion, Scott made the
telling observation of the character of the men involved in this
style of fighting, remarking that "no act of inhumanity has
marked the conduct of the volunteers of Kentucky on this
occasion; even the inveterate habit of scalping the dead has
ceased to influence."26
These small campaigns seemed to indicate that militia could
provide an adequate force for the new republic, but Scott and
Wilkinson's campaigns were to be the last successes the militia
forces of the United States enjoyed for some time.

Preparations

were hastily underway for the St. Clair campaign, which was
intended to overawe the Indians and show them the uselessness of
resisting the might of the United States.27

Rather than a

small-scale raid on the Indian villages, this expedition was to
be "a full-scale invasion north from Cincinnati, so large and so
powerful an army that it could overpower any combination of
Indians" even if assisted by the British.28

Unfortunately, the

administration delayed action on the expedition so far into the
year that supplies were lacking, the men were not adequately
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trained, and most importantly, the men lacked the discipline to
operate as a cohesive unit.29
The rush to assemble St. Clair's force led to the
administration's reluctant decision to use militia during the
campaign.

Despite misgivings generated by the lackluster

performance of militia during the Harmar campaign, and mitigated
by the successes of Scott and Wilkinson, the administration was
so pressed by considerations of time and money that militia had
to be utilized to flesh out the forces employed.

In addition to

militia, a new type of soldier, the levy, was to be used.

Levies

were a compromise between federal troops and state militia.

They

were volunteers officered and under the power of the national
government who were to serve for the duration of the campaign.30
According to Kohn, "for a campaign against the Indians in 1791,
levies revealed the administration's timidity, its
underestimation of the enemy, and its arrogance and
overconfidence.

Militarily, the levies turned out to be a

disaster. "31
As the army blundered through the wilderness, without
adequate knowledge of the terrain, and split into its three
components of regulars, militia, and levies, the Wabash Indians
and their allies simply bided their time until an opportunity for
attack presented itself.

The men suffered from want of

provisions and discipline problems were rampant.
miserable soldier on the march:

Wrote one

"The evil fates seem to have

pursued us; may they in future be auspicious."32
On October 31, 1791, a number of militia deserted, with the
result that the force was further weakened when the First
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Regiment of regulars was detached to chase them.

According to

one bitter participant in the rout by the Indians that followed:
"[It was a] fortunate circumstance that they were detached; for,
had they been there, they would only have served to swell the
numbers of the slain, and made the sacrifice on our part
greater."33 When the Indians finally attacked on November 4,
1791, the militia forces broke and ran immediately, leaving the
regular troops to close the gaps in the ranks.

For three hours

the army fought in reasonable order until finally, after
suffering around 900 casualties, the badly mauled United States
Army began a retreat which quickly degenerated into a rout.34
During the frantic race for the safety of their fort on the
Ohio River, many of the wounded and less fleet-footed of the
soldiers were left behind, including fifty female camp followers
accompanying the expedition.

Newspapers of the day carried

several lurid, alleged first-hand accounts of the atrocities that
befell those who could not keep pace with their comrades,
although many of these can perhaps be attributed to newspaper
sensationalism.35

St. Clair himself admitted later that the

conclusion of the army's encounter with the Wabash Indians was
less than satisfactory.

"It was, in fact, a flight," St. Clair

sadly acknowledged to President Washington.36
Reaction to the crushing defeat was one of shock.

President

Washington reportedly exploded with rage when informed of St.
Clair's apparent carelessness and lack of caution.

To Washington

especially, the comparison to Braddock's defeat many years before
struck home.37
the country.

Similar reactions appeared in newspapers around
Several participants in the campaign wrote letters
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detailing their shock and horror at what they had seen.

A

Captain John H. Buell wrote from Fort Washington (present-day
Cincinnati): "I . . . a m alive and well; but many of our friends
have lately exchanged worlds.

Such a total defeat has never

happened in this country since Braddock's, and I presume that was
not equal."38 Congressman Elias Boudinot's response was typical:
"It is on the whole a most mortifying and perplexing affair, and
I am at a loss to know, what steps are proper to retrieve it.
Our Sessions will be prolonged greatly by so untoward a
Circumstance, as I expect it will give rise to great debates."39
Stunned by the failure of St. Clair's efforts, the
Washington administration began to reexamine both its Indian
policy and military policy.

Influenced by the dismal performance

of the various militia involved in the Harmar and St. Clair
campaigns, Henry Knox began to lean toward the use of regular
troops as opposed to militia when fighting Indians, despite the
successes of the smaller campaigns under Scott and Wilkinson.
With the tribes now emboldened by their easy victories over the
U. S. forces under Harmar and St. Clair, further peace
initiatives seemed useless.

Military force would be the primary

means of dealing with the hostile tribes, and regular soldiers,
"disciplined," "obedient," and "proud," would be the most
effective agents of that policy.40

Some of the misgivings Knox

had expressed to President Washington in 1789 had been prophetic.
Losing campaigns was expensive.
To pursue the administration goal of enlarging the federal
army, Washington and Knox presented to Congress a plan to
increase the existing army by three regiments, which would bring
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the overall strength of the army to five regiments.

This bill

came to be called the "Five Regiment Bill," or the "Frontier
Bill," since its purpose was to bring security and safety to the
frontier settlements.

The expense of the bill (estimated at one

million dollars per year) was to be hotly debated in Congress.41
Opponents of a "standing army" saw in this bill a chance for
the government to overawe not just the Indians it was allegedly
intended to subdue, but the average citizen as well.

During this

debate in Congress these opponents, although not quoted by name
in the Annals, pointed out that many of the difficulties that
prompted a military expedition in the first place were brought on
by the greed and rapacity of the white settlers on the frontier.
Additionally, they emphasized the superiority of militia familiar
with Indian tactics as opposed to regulars recruited from cities,
"terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever
been taught to reflect on with horror."

The example of General

Scott's successful expedition against the Wabash tribes, using
militia exclusively, was referred to in defense of the military
status quo.42
The huge expense of a greatly expanding army,

"especially at

the present moment, when there is scarcely a dollar in the
Treasury,■ was also emphasized during the debate on the Frontier
Bill, and opponents hailed the alleged extravagance as a sign to
the nation's enemies that the United States was pursuing a policy
of aggression toward its neighbors, particularly Canada.
Opponents of the bill also echoed the sentiments prevalent in the
press that the war was unjust and an intrusion into lands
justifiably defended by their native inhabitants.43
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Proponents of the bill argued that regular forces, with
their greater discipline and stamina for combat, would ultimately
prove the superior form of military force against the Indians.
The merits of properly handled militia against Indians were
acknowledged by some advocates of the Frontier Bill, but they
claimed that with adequate training, regulars could prove their
equal or better in a contest with the Indians. Noted one
supporter of the Frontier Bill:
Every man who has ever seen militia in the field,
cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight
cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband and
forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the
means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper
discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert,
are much more to be depended on, especially when the object
of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be
undergone.44
Foes of the militia managed to place opponents of a standing
army in the uncomfortable position of appearing to contravene the
interests of their constituents with the following call for
immediate action on the Frontier Bill:
No dependence can therefore be placed on militia under
any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia
law now before the House; but if it ever passes, it
certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the
purpose of providing for the immediate defense of the
frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing
effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse
the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render
ourselves responsible for the consequences of this
parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and
destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.45
Thus, defenders of the principle of a free, non-threatening
state militia were faced with the dilemma of having to yield to
the urgent necessity of defending their state's frontiers with
the most efficient, albeit expensive, military force available at
the time, or else supporting the type of force that recent
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experience had indicated to be inadequate--even dangerous.

Even

James Madison, one of those most suspicious of standing armies,
had to place his constituents' immediate interests above his
fears.

Madison voted for the Frontier Bill.

The bill passed the

House on February 1, 1792, by a vote of 29 to 19.46
Although the exigencies of the Indian crisis weighed heavily
on the congressmen who dealt with the Frontier Bill, the concept
of a healthy and active militia for the

defense of the community

was still a significant factor for most of the legislators
present in the Second Congress.

As we will see, the idea of a

vital militia stretched far back in the consciousness of early
America.
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CHAPTER THREE:

MILITIA PRECEDENTS

When the Second Congress met to consider passage of the
Uniform Militia Act, it was not operating in an intellectual or
historical void.

The history of militia in both England and

colonial America was both long and extensive, and quite familiar
to most of the congressmen present, several of whom had had
first-hand experience with militia.

To understand the attitudes

at work in the Second Congress when the Uniform Militia Act of
1792 was being considered, we must look at the English and
colonial precedents.
Even in the scattered records that survive from the
Anglo-Saxon period of English history, there is often mention of
the fyrd, or host.

The fyrd was a component of what modern

historians call the trinoda necessitas, a threefold obligation
incumbent on freeholders of that time.

The other two portions of

this system included constructing bridges (bryc-geweorc), and
maintenance and construction of fortresses (burhbot). Although
ownership of property required service in the fyrd, the sense of
military obligation extended to other social classes of
Anglo-Saxon times as well.

Evidence of this appears in records

of forfeiture of money or personal property by those failing to
appear for duty in the fyrd.1
According to Michael Powicke, the fyrd "was from an early
date the king's army, both in allegiance and leadership."2 At
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the borough level the host was strictly of a defensive nature,
but mounted warriors also comprised an important constituent of
the fyrd. It was around these men, primarily thegns, or
retainers, that the followings of earls and royal reeves
collected.

Eventually the elite huscarles, a force of mounted

troops, were added to the royal force, and it was this
combination of common militia and select forces that prevailed
until the Battle of Hastings.3 With the Norman Conquest, the
feudal levy was introduced. Service in the feudal levy was
distinguished from the general levy (which was still in effect)
by tenure of land under the king as feudal lord.

In both systems

one could still avoid actual service in the levy by payment or by
hiring a substitute to serve in one's stead.

Another important

distinction between the feudal and general levy was that service
in the general levy precluded overseas duty, whereas members of
the feudal levy were subject to the whims of the king when it
came to where they might end up fighting.4
By the eighteen century the English militia had evolved into
a system whereby each county had a "lord lieutenant" responsible
for the muster and training of the militia.

The lieutenant was

accountable to the crown for the readiness of the men, and a
system of fines was in effect for non-compliance with militia
rules.

Significantly, the English Militia Law of 1757 provided

that "the militia shall not, on any occasion, be compelled to go
out of the kingdom."5 By the middle of the eighteenth century,
then, the English military had divided into two forces:
professional, regular army primarily for colonial and

a large,
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expeditionary duties, and a carefully regulated militia intended
for purely domestic and defensive purposes.
In colonial America, the earliest settlers in Massachusetts
and Virginia adopted militia systems to defend themselves from
the Indian threat, and these systems were altered from the
English model to fit the circumstances of the colonial
environment.6 Regarding the Jamestown settlement in particular,
William L. Shea has said:
The ancient concept of the community in arms, a militia
composed of all adult males who were expected to take up
arms whenever danger threatened, was initially more
appropriate to that society than the current English notion
of a smallish peacekeeping militia. It is perhaps not
overly romantic to say that a kind of hybrid Anglo-American
fvrd existed for a brief time on the shores of Chesapeake
Bay.7
As the colonies grew, the militia of each developed
according to the defensive needs of that particular colony.

In

time, those colonies regularly challenged by frontier
difficulties seemed to develop more efficient militia than
others.

According to John Shy, by the mid-point of the

eighteenth century only New England had a vital, effective
militia system, while the militias of Virginia, New York, South
Carolina, and Georgia had either atrophied or become apathetic.8
As a result of general colonial indifference to events outside
each colony's area, the Seven Years War was fought largely with
regular forces and volunteers from the respective colonies,
rather than with militia.9
After the immediate threat of Indian attack subsided in the
colonies, the militia became something of a social club in some
areas, and a bastion of the middle class.

In fact, the burden of

actual combat during the period preceding the American Revolution
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befell those who were indigent or unable to find other
employment.10 According to Martin and Lender:
Over time the militia became the exclusive province of free,
white, propertied males, usually between the ages of 16 and
60. Thus Indians, slaves, free blacks, indentured servants,
apprentices, and indigents came to be excluded from militia
service. In actuality, a primary function of the militia
turned out to be protecting the propertied and the
privileged in colonial society from the unpropertied and
unprivileged.11
The connection between property and militia service is a
strong one.

When the militia members felt that their personal

property was in danger of being despoiled or plundered, they
could fight with determination, as they did at Lexington and
Concord.

When the threat was distant or not immediately

apparent, they could be disinterested.12 As Martin and Lender put
it:

"In actuality, the military component of the concept of

citizenship in late colonial America extended as far as the outer
limits of property holding went."13
Despite the provincial outlook of many of the militia, the
popular conception endured of the selfless citizen-soldier who
willingly faced peril while defending his country.

The

performance of the Virginia backwoodsmen on the Braddock campaign
is a case in point.

Although the efforts of Braddock ended in

disaster, the prevailing sentiment then and now is that the
colonials were naturally more talented fighters than the redcoats
in the campaign.

The tactical errors of the British commander

provided ammunition to an already existing colonial bias toward
the supposedly noble militia.14 The efforts of the militia army
at Breed's (or Bunker) Hill provided further fuel for those
proponents of the militia who did not comprehend the rigors of a
protracted campaign.

It was one thing to fight bravely from
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entrenched fortifications, as at Bunker Hill, but quite another
to face bayonet-equipped regular troops in open field fighting.15
At the onset of the Revolution, the notion of the militia's
moral superiority to regular troops was in common vogue in the
colonies.

Professional troops were thought to be fighting for

spoil and plunder, decidedly ignoble goals, while the militia was
perceived as defending hearth and home.

As Don Higginbotham puts

it:
The roots of this American militia ethos were imported from
England at a time when the Stuart monarchy was turning from
a centuries-old militia system to professional soldiers as
its first line of defense. Certain seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century British writers, who kept alive a radical
Whig tradition in the parent kingdom and whose works were
widely disseminated in America, glorified an English militia
that had not performed effectively in modern times and
exaggerated the benefits of scarcely trained yeomen in arms
because of their dislike and fear of salaried, full-time
forces.16
Probably the most influential seventeenth-century writer on
the virtue of the citizen soldier was James Harrington.
Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), says Lawrence Delbert
Cress, "provides the starting point for understanding the
assumptions behind the anti-standing army rhetoric that helped
shape American perceptions of the military's relationship to the
civil constitution."17

In Harrington's imaginary world, property

was the key to citizenship.
nor bear arms.

Without it, one could neither vote

Military and political power merged in this

system, as those who held the balance of property would control
society itself.18
Analyzing Harrington's philosophy, J. G. A. Pocock is in
substantial agreement with Cress on this point, noting that
"Harrington's citizen may or may not be an entrepreneur, but he
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is primarily a freeholder."19 More important, as Pocock points
out:
The right to bear arms, and the propertied independence
enabling one to provide one's own, become the tests of
citizenship in Harrington's England as they had been in
Athens or Rome. County assemblies are at once assemblies of
the electorate and musters of the militia; the citizens are
exercising by their ballots the freedom they muster in their
arms, and casting their votes in the course of their
military drill.20
Although the radical Whig thinkers rejected Harrington's
idea that in a system such as his the landed citizens were immune
from military abuses, they did adopt his idea of "that concept or
bogey of the standing army which was to figure so prominently
among the political ideas of the next century."21 The radical
Whigs, through their writings, kept emphasizing the evils of a
"hired mercenary force" that could imperil the stability of
English government.

In Cress's words:

A militia offered the constitutionally safe means of
providing for the national defense. A revitalized militia
would return the nation's defense to its most
interested--that is, propertied--citizens, reinstating the
balance between citizens and government and removing the
tyrannical threat of the monarchy.22
The threat to civil liberties posed by a standing army
recurs often in the political literature of the seventeenth
century.

Pocock summarized the Country (as opposed to Court, or

town) view of English politics:
The essence of the standing army is its long-service
professionalism, which is what makes it a sinister interest
and a potential uncontrolled branch of government. But
there is an ancient institution known as the militia,
whereby the public defense is exercised directly by the
independent proprietors appearing in their arms at their own
charge. If the armed force of the nation is embodied only
in this form, there can be no threat to public liberty or
the public purse; and the proprietor's liberty is guaranteed
as much by his right to be the sole fighter in his own
defense as by his ultimate right to cast a vote in his own
government. To defend the militia against a standing army
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is the same thing as to defend Parliament against
corruption.23
What may be most significant about the radical Whig ideas
and political theories is the availability of their literature to
the colonial leaders of America.

According to Cress, many of the

political tracts written by radical Whigs found their way into
the libraries of most of the men who would come to be regarded as
the Founding Fathers.

This was the result in part of the efforts

of the radical Whig propagandist Thomas Hollis.

The pro-army

literature of Adam Smith, however, received considerably less
dissemination in the colonies.24
One of the more prominent Virginians influenced by Whig
philosophy on standing armies was George Mason.

Speaking at the

Virginia Convention in 1788, Mason echoed Whig thinking when he
urged his colleagues:

"Recollect the history of most nations of

the world— what havoc, desolation, and destruction, have been
perpetrated by standing armies!"25 Mason went on to express the
standard corollary to this notion, that of a virtuous militia
which would obviate the hazards and corruption of a regular
army.26
Any who doubted the danger of having a standing army in the
community's midst had to look no further than the Boston area,
where the perception of a standing army as the tool of a corrupt
ministry was reinforced by the so-called Boston Massacre of 1770.
Although the affair was provoked in part by the actions of the
townspeople, the incident served to fan the flames of those who
felt the very presence of regular troops in the community was in
some way a plan to enslave the populace.27
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After the Revolution, the fear of a standing army retained
an immediacy in the thought of men of the Revolution, even to the
point that the bitter lessons of the war regarding the
inconsistency of the state militia were blissfully ignored.
the optimistic atmosphere that followed the Revolution,

In

"belief

in citizen-soldiers became inextricably intertwined with an
undying faith in the martial prowess of untrained men led by
political generals."28 This attitude was still quite strong in
the 1790s and is reflected in the debates over the military
policy of the time.
While pushing for ratification of the Constitution, James
Madison voiced a concern common to people of the era, when he
spoke of the dangers of military unpreparedness, and excessive
preparedness:
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the
undisciplined valour of all other nations, and rendered her
the mistress of the world. Nor the less true is it, that
the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her
military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far
as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the
price of her military establishments. A standing force
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a
necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its
inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may
be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable
circumspection and precaution.29
Madison, then, while certainly no admirer of a standing
army, acknowledged that requirements could arise that would
require a regular military establishment, but warned that it
should be watched closely.

Besides, said Madison, "America

united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier,
exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than
America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for
combat."30 As things turned out, Madison got much of what he
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wished in the Constitution, as far as things military.

As

Frederick B. Wiener puts it:
The Constitution as adopted reflected a fear of standing
armies. One was authorized, but the militia was not
abolished. It was to be organized, armed, and disciplined
by Congress, but, except when in federal service, was to be
governed by the states. The President was to be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and of the militia while in
federal service.31
The fear of a strong central government usurping individual
rights led to passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791, mainly from
the efforts of James Madison.
Amendment says:

The much-ballyhooed Second

"A well-regulated militia being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed."

But, "the 'free State'

referred to was not the federal government," it was the
individual states.32
Looking at the Second Amendment objectively in modern times,
Frederick B. Wiener calls it "substantially a dead letter in the
face of police power necessities and a recession from the
frontier conditions which required every citizen to go armed for
his own defense."

Wiener also notes "that the Third Amendment,

which limits the quartering of soldiers, has yet to be invoked,
indicates rather forcefully that the fears of the ratifiers were
not well-founded; they cannot detract, however, from the
prevalence of views then entertained."33

Here Wiener is hitting

the nail on the head in the matter of the militia and
post-Revolutionary attitudes toward civil liberties.

What may

seem an unreasoning paranoia over military domination to someone
in the twentieth century, probably would have made perfect sense
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to a person who had just seen the conclusion of years of heated
military conflict.
While the notion of a struggle between good and evil
embodied by the militia on one hand and a regular army on the
other hand may seem farfetched to a modern person, the concern
over the quality of the nation's military readiness by members of
the Second Congress is apparent from the debates in the Annals.
Although the past could furnish fuel for both sides of the
argument over whether militia or regulars were superior, the
Second Congress had to devise a military system that would best
serve the immediate needs of a country still unsure of its
military destiny.

As we shall see, the high hopes of many of the

more militia-oriented congressmen would come to frustration when
faced with the reality of implementing a national plan for the
militia.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

PLANS FOR A MILITIA

The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 as passed by the Second
Congress bore little resemblance to the plan originally proposed
by Secretary of War Henry Knox in January 1790.

From the plan

initially set forth by Knox emerged a ramshackle system of
militia that was barren of enforceable measures.

The process by

which Knox's system of universal military obligation was
transformed into a piece of "politico-military nostalgia become
law"1 was a lengthy and interesting one.

The First and Second

Congresses transformed the administration's original plan into an
almost unrecognizable plan for a national militia.
The plan that Henry Knox submitted to the First Congress was
not the first suggested plan for an American national militia.
Both Friedrich von Steuben and Henry Knox had prepared plans
involving the militia during the years of the Confederation.
Steuben's plan favored a system of military academies designed to
create a number of professionally trained officers to both lead
the regular army and the state militia.

Ten percent of the

graduates of these academies would enter the regular army, with
the remaining ninety percent heading back to their respective
state militia to provide a core of leadership for those units.
By this system a cadre of officers trained in the art of war
would be produced for the young nation, and a comprehensive
nation-wide manpower defense network would be established.
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Steuben was not of the opinion that every citizen was cut out to
be a soldier, but felt rather that war was the province of the
highly-trained and the skillful.2
Washington took the ideas put forth by Steuben and other
advisors such as Timothy Pickering, Rufus Putnam, Adjutant
General Edward Hand, and George Clinton, and boiled them down
into one defense plan he felt suited the particular needs of the
country at the time.

The concept of classing, that is,

distinguishing between men's militia obligation according to
their age, was common to Pickering, Steuben, and, of course,
Knox, and Washington also favored such a system.

Washington and

his advisors desired a formula of militia in national defense
that would involve a select group of militia.

These select

militiamen would be ready to respond at a moment's notice to a
military crisis.

As is usually the case in such matters, the

hardship of defending the nation would fall to the youngest
class, in this case those aged eighteen to twenty-five.3
In his 1783 message to Congress known as his "Sentiments on
a Peace Establishment," Washington wrote that the young not only
displayed more ardor for military life, but that their removal
from the general society during a military emergency would be
less destructive to the social and economic well-being of society
than would those more advanced in years.

Washington also felt

that the group of militia composed of the youngest members should
be detached from the general mass of militia for more intense
training and duty.

Interestingly, Washington favored enrolling
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all adult males aged eighteen to fifty, but wanted the select
corps to be comprised of volunteers amenable to incurring a
three- to seven-year militia obligation.4
Washington liked Steuben's plan for a system of military
academies to train the nation's regular and militia officers,
feeling that this would keep the germ of military science alive
in the new nation.

He believed then (1783) as he did later that

a small regular army supplemented by a well-trained body of
militia was the best means of national defense.5 This notion of
a dependable national militia was the idea behind the Uniform
Militia Act, even though the act was ultimately unsatisfactory.
"Military efficiency was critical," concluded Delbert Cress, "but
in the minds of General Washington and his advisors, the
principal means to that end remained militia reform."6
When Alexander Hamilton received then army
commander-in-chief Washington's 1783 plan, he was sitting in the
Continental Congress as a member of the congressional committee
working on the peace establishment.

On the necessity of a

national army and the equipment required to arm them, Hamilton
concurred with Washington.

Hamilton advised against the

construction of national military academies, however, due to the
lack of money to pay for them at the moment.7 Curiously, though,
Hamilton came up with the idea of classing men not by their age,
but by their marital status, with single men to bear the brunt of
the republic's militia needs.

In his plan, single men would need

to report six times per year for training, while married men
would have to attend only four.

Also, both groups would include

men as old as 62 fifty, significantly degrading the possible
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military effectiveness of their units should extended service be
necessary.8
Over and above Hamilton's two classes of militia, there was
to be a class of volunteers paid, supplied, and armed by the
continental government.

This group, to number not more than two

per cent of the militia, were to train every two weeks in
companies, each month in regiments, and appear in camp for twenty
days each year.

This class, which would differ from a regular

army only in the lack of day to day training, would resemble a
reserve component of the army itself rather than the militia.9
Ultimately, plans to bring the militia under national
control during the Confederation era came to naught because of a
lack of funding for such massive programs and the old fear of an
enlarged military establishment.

In a nation which had just

emerged from a lengthy war for independence, many felt that an
expanded military of any sort in peacetime was dangerous.10 This
point was driven home to those members of Congress who had to
flee Philadelphia for Princeton when angry members of the
Pennsylvania Line arrived in town demanding back pay.11
Unfortunately for Hamilton's peacetime defense plan (which
overall, favored an expanded regular army), the timing could not
have been worse.

Congress, concerned with the solvency of the

country and suspicious of plans that would seemingly centralize
military power, lost any enthusiasm for Hamilton's proposal.12
Fears that the states would be dominated by a consolidated
national system were not all confined to the small states, as
evidenced by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.

Gerry successfully

opposed Hamilton's plan for a stronger military, noting the
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safety provided by the geographical isolation of the United
States and the Articles of Confederation's lack of power to raise
a standing army in time of peace.

In addition, Gerry and his

colleagues were quick to point out that the militia represented
"the Constitutional and only safe defence of Republican
governments. 013
With the defeat of Hamilton's peacetime military proposal,
the next blueprint to appear was Henry Knox's 1786 Plan for the
General Arrangement of the Militia, which he submitted to
Congress in response to its request for a military plan that
would fit the Articles' requirements.14

This plan was the genesis

of Knox's 1790 proposal, which evolved, in greatly altered form,
into the Uniform Militia Act of 1792.
As in his 1790 plan, Knox would require the youth of the
country to form an "advanced corps" of men aged eighteen to
twenty, who would be subject to camp for a total of forty-two
days each year for training.

In his later plan, which he devised

in response to President Washington's request for a militia plan,
Knox would have those of eighteen and nineteen report for thirty
days annual training, while those twenty years of age would be
required to attend only the last ten days of camp.15

In both

plans the youth of the country would be improved by the "camps of
discipline," where sports that corresponded with war, such as
swimming, running, and wrestling would be practiced, as well as
"such other exercises as shall render the body flexible and
vigorous."16
After service in the advanced corps, the youth would enter
the much less active "main corps," which would practice a mere

62

four days each year.

The leadership of the main corps was

expected to come eventually from the highly-trained advanced
corps, as they matriculated into the older age bracket.

The main

corps was to be comprised of men from twenty-one to forty-five
years of age.17
Not to be denied their chance at martial glory were the men
of the "reserved corps," aged forty-six to sixty.

Required to

muster only twice annually for inspection of arms, or "whenever
the defence of the State may render the measure necessary," the
reserved corps was to be called out only in dire emergency or to
free up the advanced corps for more pressing duty.18 Knox noted
the natural reluctance of the middle-aged to rush to arduous or
extended military duty, and commented that "Youth is the time for
the State to avail itself of those services which it has a right
to demand and by which it is to be invigorated and preserved. 1,19
Observing that the youth will naturally be swayed by the
attractions of "military parade," Knox also saw that "the head of
a family, anxious for its general welfare, and perhaps its
immediate subsistence, will reluctantly quit his domestic duties
for any length of time."20
Under Knox's 1786 plan the continental government would
supply the weapons necessary for the militia, which the soldiers
would retain at the end of their time in the advanced corps.

Any

mobilization of the national militia would be directed and
overseen by state officials, although service during national
emergencies would not be restricted to the confines of the
individual states.21

In this way the states were to be protected
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from abuse of the militia, while the national government would
not be caught short by a dearth of well-trained soldiers.
Knox's 1786 plan, if enacted, would have bypassed the need
for the standing army that terrified anti-federalist thinkers of
the period.

The plan had appeal to republican thinkers, with its

emphasis on inculcating the youth with wholesome virtues such as
physical fitness and clean living.

The expense and time required

by the plan, however, would have doomed it had the Confederation
existed long enough to consider it seriously.

Also, the idea of

a nationally controlled militia was contrary to what some
republican thinkers felt was safe.22 With the advent of the
Constitutional Convention, Knox's plan submerged temporarily in
the consciousness of national lawmakers, to resurface in the
First Congress.
After the ratification of the Constitution, President
Washington again asked Knox to present a plan for a national
militia.

In January, 1790, Secretary of War Knox presented the

1786 plan, slightly modified, to Congress for consideration.

Not

helping the cause of a national militia was Knox's‘prefacing
letter, which mentioned the need of the country for "a national
system of defense adequate to the probable exigencies of the
United States, whether arising from internal or external
causes."23 While extolling the virtues of trained citizens in
arms, Knox rather gracelessly mentioned that "The convulsive
events, generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or
ambition, require that the Government should possess a strong
corrective 66 arm. "24
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The suggestion, probably unintentional, that a national
militia could be useful in suppressing an unruly populace struck
the wrong tone with congressmen concerned with preserving
liberties so recently hard-won.

The plan's federal supervision

would also require a natural diminishing of the individual state
militia's military independence.

Noting these factors, General

Benjamin Lincoln confided to Knox that though the bill "would
make ours the strongest militia in the world, the people will not
adopt it here if I know Massachusetts."25
General Lincoln's prediction proved correct, largely
because, with all philosophic considerations aside, Knox's plan
to "perpetuate and secure the invaluable principles of liberty"
would cost an estimated $384,440 for one year's operation of the
advanced corps.26

In addition to the financial objections lay

concerns that the "virtuous conduct of youth" referred to in
Knox's outline might not be best continued in a military camp.27
With Hamilton's financial program the most urgent and
time-consuming matter facing the First Congress, Knox's 1790 plan
for a federally supervised militia disappeared onto the
legislative back burner until it reappeared in July 1790, greatly
altered by a congressional committee.

This bill, introduced by

Elias Boudinot, still retained the concept of using the youngest
men, in this bill those aged eighteen to twenty-five, as an elite
light infantry force in the militia battalion or regiment.28
After emerging in this configuration, the militia bill went back
into committee seclusion for another five months, until it was
debated in December 1790.29
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During the debates of December 1790, Congress argued over
the issues of the ages involved in the proposed militia plan, the
ever-present issue of state versus federal power, and the
ultimately destructive issue of exemptions from militia service.
Quakers especially objected to military service on grounds of
conscience.

James Jackson of Georgia, who was later to lose his

seat to Anthony Wayne in one of the most fraudulent elections in
Georgia history, vehemently attacked the granting of religious
exemptions, noting that the ultimate consequence of granting
exemptions was a standing army.30 Aedanus Burke, himself a
militia member, argued that widespread exemptions would lead to a
situation where society would split into two classes of people:
the rich and the working class.

He felt that "all should equally

be made to turn out in the ranks, high and low, rich and poor,
old and young, and thus make the militia honorable."31
However, Burke, and James Madison saw no problem with
granting exemption from militia duty for those truly religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms.

Madison did not believe that “the

citizens of the United States would hypocritically renounce their
principles, their conscience, and their God, for the sake of
enjoying the exemption."32 Another exemption surfaced in this
debate that was perhaps not as high-minded as that of the
Quakers: that of congressional exemption from militia duty.
Boudinot himself defended congressional exemption by saying:
"The business of legislation is more arduous and momentous than
any other; and

ought not to be impeded, or rendered liable to be

frustrated by any other."33
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After the debates of December, 1790, the militia bill again
languished in committee for many months, not reappearing until
just three days before St. Clair's defeat in November, 1791.
According to one of the leading historians of the Federalist Era,
Richard H. Kohn, "agreement was impossible on any provision which
increased the burden on individual citizens or provided for a
national standard."34 The bill became a classic case of what
occurs when something attempts to be all things to all people.
By the time the bill finally came to a vote in March, 1792,
Knox's original plan had been stripped of classing, federal
inspection of state militia, and fines for non-compliance with
militia rules.

In its tremendously altered form, the law of 1792

did not much resemble its original version of 1790.
While the tortured efforts of the Second Congress to produce
a workable plan for a national militia bogged down in a slough of
compromises, the debates on the militia issue did serve to point
up the differences of opinion prevalent in the House.

The

variety of objections to the original act emphasized the
uselessness of trying to generate a system of truly universal
military service in a large republic.

The abundance of

self-interested parties seeking exemptions from militia duty is
proof that Knox's original 1790 could never survive intact in its
course toward passage as the Uniform Militia Act.

However, the

often passionate debates over the Uniform Militia Act and the
Frontier Bill do serve as additional evidence of the deepening
political rift in the Second Congress.
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CHAPTER FIVE:

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before analyzing the voting patterns of the Second
Congress, we must examine the political circumstances facing
those legislators.

Voting on such issues as the Uniform Militia

Act and the Five Regiment Bill, the congressmen were acting in an
era of much more loosely categorized political allegiances than
those same congressmen even a session later.

Polarization of

political philosophies and attitudes into two vigorous, opposing
parties in the House and Senate that had begun with objections to
Hamilton's financial programs was soon to accelerate as a result
of the uproar over the conduct of foreign affairs.1
With the political bifurcation that issued from these and
other events, divisions between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
(later Democratic-Republicans or simply Republicans) became more
identifiable in the Third and subsequent Congresses than in the
Second.

One of the leading historians of this period, John C.

Miller, says that "especially in the House of Representatives,
many members refused to wear the livery of either party; instead,
they made a point of voting as the interests of their state and
section, rather than the party leaders, dictated.

Even as late

as the Third Congress (1795-96) almost half the members of the
House prided themselves upon being free of party ties and
obligations."2 Although many legislators sought to distance
themselves from party labels, use of cluster-bloc analysis does
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show that a large number of members in the Second Congress
regularly voted for one of the two major factions.
Although Alexander Hamilton and James Madison became leaders
of opposing political groups, both had warned against the dangers
of faction or party before the Constitution was ratified.
Madison offered the view in The Federalist Papers that a faction
was "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united or actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community."3 In Madison's opinion, although faction was a
regrettable element in the polity of the nation, it was an
unavoidable by-product of a free society. As he said:

"Liberty

is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires."4 Madison continued on the subject of
political faction by noting that, since the causes of faction
could not be removed, "relief is to be sought in the means of
controlling its effects."5
Arguing at the time for a stronger union, Madison felt that
the best restraint upon the effects of faction was a healthy
republican form of government.

For safety's sake, a large

republic was preferable to a small one.

With a large society,

the influence of a particular sect would be diluted, while in a
tiny society the danger of "factious combinations" would be
enlarged.

Acknowledging that parties (a designation that Madison

used interchangeably with faction) would exist in a free society,
Madison opted for the idea of safety in numbers.6 This idea,
with its parallels in the field of religious liberty, notes
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Richard Hofstadter, apparently originated from Madison's
philosophical attraction to the ideas of Voltaire, who had once
noted that "in England one sect would have produced slavery and
two a civil war, but that a multitude of sects caused the people
to live in peace."7
In a letter to the National Gazette in January 1792, Madison
reaffirmed his opinion that parties were unavoidable, but evil.
"A difference of interests, real or supposed, is the most natural
and fruitful source of them," wrote Madison on the origins of
political parties.8 Besides "withholding unnecessary
opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of property,
by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of
riches," Madison said one way to "combat the evil" of party was
to make "one party a check on the other, so far as the existence
of parties cannot be prevented, nor their views accommodated.

If

this is not the voice of reason, it is that of republicanism."9
The party that Madison and republicanism were determined to
check during the 1790's was headed by a man Forrest McDonald
called the "most brilliant bastard in American history."10

By

1792 opposition to Hamilton's programs of funding the public debt
and establishment of a national bank, and his general
interference in the affairs of other departments of the
government, had resulted in a potent political alliance between
Madison and Jefferson.

In a curious turnabout from his earlier

stance against party and faction, Hamilton was now engaged in a
bitter struggle for political control of the country.11

Defense

policy was just one of many issues outside the bounds of the
Treasury Department in which Hamilton felt compelled to meddle.
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In fact, according to John C. Miller, "so completely did he
dominate Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, that he [Knox] became
hardly more than a minion of the Treasury."12
Writing in Federalist 21. in December, 1787, Hamilton had
warned that "A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the
ruins of order and law, while no succour could constitutionally
be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the
government."13

Referring in this case to Shay's Rebellion,

Hamilton also condemned the danger of "inordinate pride of State
importance" in the Confederation system.14

In a later issue of

The Federalist. Hamilton referred to the necessity of "the terror
of an example" when dealing with domestic rebellion or seditious
behavior, an ominous foreshadowing of the eagerness with which he
forced the issue of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.15 On the
whole, Hamilton's writings suggest a greater willingness to use
force against those opposing the government than do the writings
of Madison.16
Statements by Hamilton against the wickedness of faction may
seem strange in retrospect, considering Hamilton's aggressiveness
in implementing his financial and other policies.

Richard

Hofstadter offers the suggestion that "the whole tradition of
anti-party writing is full of the works of men who were strong
partisans; this tradition is, in very large part, the work of
partisan writers and political leaders who are actually appealing
to a general distrust of the idea of a party or to advance the
interest of another party whose greatest claim to glory is that
it will surmount and eliminate the party battle itself.”17

Such

behavior, which would have been hypocrisy had it been conscious,
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was unbecoming to the character of an eighteenth-century
gentleman.

But this was soon to be small potatoes compared to

the bitter partisan rivalry that would erupt as relations with
France and England worsened.
Writing in 1779 to Thomas McKean, John Adams spoke of the
merits of an opposition in Congress or a council "to balance
individuals, and bodies, and interests one against another, and
bring the truth to light and justice to prevail.”18 However,
Adams apparently saw a difference between a "loyal"
issue-oriented opposition and narrow patron-client partisanship,
since in a letter a year later to Jonathan Jackson he said:
There is nothing I dread so much as a division of the
republic into two great parties, each arranged under its
leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each
other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded
as the greatest political evil under our Constitution.19
Adams could not have been pleased with the political
situation as it stood in the early 1790's, as both Hamilton and
Jefferson had discovered not only a mutual political antagonism,
but the handiness of the press for party purposes.

To counter

Hamilton's Gazette of the United States, edited by John Fenno,
Jefferson enticed the thoroughly republican Philip Freneau to
work in Philadelphia as editor of the National Gazette.
Jefferson even used political patronage as an incentive for
Freneau to journey to the capital in 1791 and goad the
Federalists in his paper.20 Jefferson, through Freneau, took
every opportunity to attack Hamilton's financial programs, which
ran directly contrary to Jefferson's conception of an agrarian
society, a society where farmers, rather than merchants and
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speculators, would represent the true nature of American
society.21
Although both Jefferson and Madison were active in arranging
Freneau's newspaper career, Noble Cunningham claims that "there
is no basis for assuming that Jefferson and Madison set out to
organize a political party with a blueprint in hand and that the
establishment of a party newspaper was the first step."22

Rather,

the Freneau venture was a result of Jefferson and Madison's
frustration in informing the public of the inequities of
Hamilton's financial programs.

Cunningham notes that the end

result of Freneau's paper was to speed the formation of national
political parties by "bringing the conflict between Jefferson and
Hamilton before the public view. ”23
By May 1792, Hamilton had been prodded enough to confide his
feelings on the political situation in a rather petulant letter
to Edward Carrington.

Hamilton noted that Madison's "insidious

insinuations" (Hamilton's emphasis) suggesting that Hamilton was
involved in speculation were "actuated by personal and political
animosity."24

Hamilton went on to accuse Madison of subverting

the administration's measures and attempting to diminish the role
of the Secretary of the Treasury in the government.25
Interestingly, in the long and angry letter to Carrington,
Hamilton mentioned that "Mr. Madison nevertheless opposed
directly a reference to me to report wavs & means for the Western
expedition, & combatted on principle the propriety of such
measures."26 What Hamilton was referring to here was the Five
Regiment Bill, or Frontier Bill, to raise an additional three
regiments to the regular army's existing two.

The resolution
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that provoked Hamilton was that of 7 March 1792 resolving "That
the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report to this House
his opinion of the best mode for raising the additional supplies
requisite for the ensuing year."27 Hamilton viewed this as an
infringement on his power, and Theodore Sedgwick, as ardent a
Federalist as ever there was, rushed to head off this challenge
by Madison.
Sedgwick condensed Madison's arguments in order to rebut
them:
This gentleman [Madison] had given in detail the several
proceedings which ought to take place to obtain on hand the
benefit of knowledge of the Secretary, and to maintain on
the other the independency of the House. Thus, according
to his plan, was the business to be pursued. The House
was, in the first place, to call on the Secretary for a
state of facts; it was then to resolve itself into a
Committee of the Whole, to form opinions; these opinions
were then to be referred to the Secretary, for him to
report respecting them a systematic arrangement.28
Hamilton was enraged at this ploy by Madison, and vowed that
"if he had prevailed, a certain consequence was, my
resignation--that I would not be fool enough to make pecuniary
sacrifices and endure a life of extreme drudgery without
opportunity either to do material good or to acquire reputation;
and frequently with responsibility in reputation for measures in
which I had no hand, and in respect to which, the part I had
acted, if any, could not be known."29
Hamilton then mentioned, in a manner indicating the cynical
Federalist philosophy of human nature mentioned by John C.
Miller, that "several, who had generally acted with me from
various motives, vanity, self importance, &c. &c. were enlisted"
against Madison's efforts.30

Despite Hamilton's boast that he had
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confounded Madison by his counteroffensive in the House, the
resolution passed by a vote of thirty-one to twenty-seven.31
Later in his same letter to Carrington, Hamilton bitterly
resented the efforts of Jefferson and Madison "to narrow the
Federal authority," not only on the issue of a national bank, but
also in the field of military affairs.

Singling out Madison in

particular, Hamilton growled that "in the Militia bill & in a
variety of minor cases he has leaned to abridging the exercise of
federal [.sic] authority, & leaving as much as possible to the
States & he has lost no opportunity of sounding the alarm with
great affected solemnity at encroachments meditated on the rights
of the States, & of holding up the bugbear of a faction in the
Government having designs unfriendly to Liberty."32
What Hamilton referred to was Madison's attempt to modify
"An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."
Madison had acted to restrict the exercise of the President's
power "to the recess of Congress and till an unspecified number
of days after the next session shall commence."33 As the act
finally passed Congress on May 2, 1792, the President could call
forth the militia to suppress insurrections "until the expiration
of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing session."34
This time limit would supposedly prevent the accrual of total
control of power over the militia by the President.

At the same

time it seems to have infuriated Alexander Hamilton.
So virulent became the conflict between Hamilton and
Jefferson that President Washington tried to mediate the dispute.
Fearful of losing either of his most gifted secretaries,
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Washington appealed to both men.
1792, Washington said:

Writing to Hamilton in August,

"Differences in political opinions are as

unavoidable as, to a certain point, they may perhaps be
necessary; but it is to be regretted, exceedingly, that subjects
cannot be discussed with temper on one hand, or decisions
submitted to without having the motives which led to them,
improperly implicated on the other:

and this regret borders on

chagrin when we find that Men of abilities--zealous
patriots--having the same general objects in view, and the same
upright intentions to prosecute them, will not exercise more
charity in deciding on the opinions, and actions of one
another. ”35
Washington went on to tell Hamilton that mutual forbearances
should be exercised by all parties in the dispute, or else "I do
not see how the Reins of Government are to be managed, or how the
Union of the States can be much longer preserved."

The President

noted that the political conflict between the two faction leaders
showed "the consequences of diversified opinions, when pushed
with too much tenacity."36
In a similar message to Jefferson describing the
difficulties facing the nation on the western frontiers,
Washington repeated the themes of harmony and reconciliation he
expressed to Hamilton, and added how unfortunate it was "that
while we are encompassed on all sides with avowed enemies and
insidious friends, that internal dissensions should be harrowing
and tearing our vitals."

Appealing for charity to prevail among

his subordinates, Washington called for an end to "wounding
suspicions and irritable charges" or else the "wheels of
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Government will clog."

Washington noted that the infighting that

had occurred among his cabinet members had embarrassed the nation
and given him personal pain. ”37
Despite his appeals for peace within his cabinet, Washington
was to be disappointed, since the philosophies and personalities
of Hamilton and Jefferson were too contradictory to allow an easy
settlement of differences.

Hamilton would never imbibe

Jefferson's or Madison's ideas of republicanism, since he would
never overcome his doubts about the stability of republican
government.

Also, by 1792, the personal animosity between the

two men had reached the point of no return.38

The rift eventually

culminated in a power struggle that only ended with the removal
from the political scene of one of these men.39
One of the more prominent Federalist congressmen in the
Second House who was alert to the rising sectionalism in
legislative matters was Fisher Ames of Massachusetts.

Writing to

a friend in January 1792, Ames observed that the Federalists were
in power now but that "an immense mass of sour matter is
fermenting at the southward."40 After making this uncomplimentary
comment on his colleagues from the South, Ames noted later that
month the emergence of a southern voting coalition in the Second
House:

"Virginia moves in a solid column, and the discipline of

the party is as severe as the Prussians.

Deserters are not

spared."41 While Ames' comments were colored by partisan
rhetoric, he correctly identified Madison as the man in charge in
the opposition bloc of the House.

Ames noted that "Madison is

become a desperate party leader, and I am not sure of his
stopping at any ordinary point of extremity."42 As cluster bloc
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analysis shows, Ames was correct in his assessment of the
regional nature of the opposing voting bloc, at least on the
overall business of the Second Congress.
The development of political parties, which accelerated
during the second administration of George Washington, was,
according to Joseph Charles, foreshadowed by the sectional
division resulting from the vote on Hamilton's financial
program.43

Charles, like Cunningham, McDonald, and most modern

historians, refuted Charles Beard's thesis that the origin of the
Republican Party can be found in the remnants of the old
Antifederalists.44 Referring to the idea of a political party
connection between the Constitutional Convention and the federal
Congress, Cunningham remarked that "the fact that twelve
Federalists of 1787 became Republicans and six could not be
classified seems of equal significance with the fact that
twenty-five became Federalists and suggests the impossibility of
showing any substantial relationship."45
Charles thought that Hamilton's financial proposals in the
First Congress were "the first milestones in the growth of
parties," but he conceded that it is difficult to pin down an
exact date when parties came into existence with definitive
characteristics.46 Cunningham, on the other hand, points out that
the elections of 1792 serve as evidence that Republicans were
organizing as a party, although "it was clear that parties did
not reach very deeply into the political life of the country."47
McDonald seems to agree with Cunningham, for he argues that
political activity in the country prior to 1793 was still
primarily a local or regional concern for those involved in it,
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although awareness of national affairs was beginning to emerge in
the electorate.48
Cunningham documented the voting record of the first session
of the Second Congress (October 1791 to May 1792) and found that
Madison had developed a following of sorts.

Using a rather

unsophisticated method of analysis, in which Madison's voting
behavior was assumed to be a perfect archetype of
Anti-Federalism, Cunningham selected thirty-five roll calls
during that session. He found that seventeen men agreed with
Madison at least two-thirds of the time.

Another group of

thirteen to fifteen members opposed the Madison group, leaving
about half of the House apparently neutral or pro-Federalist in
this coalescing political situation.

Cunningham is quick to note

that there was not yet a rigid two-party organization in
Congress, although the alliances forming in this session did not
appear to have been extant in the previous one.49
One event in particular that emphasizes the growing partisan
outlook in the Second Congress is the disputed election of
Anthony Wayne.

During the 1791 campaign for a House of

Representatives seat from coastal Georgia, Anthony Wayne (of
Revolutionary War fame) and James Jackson, the incumbent,
conducted what seemed to be an uneventful campaign for the
position.

After Wayne's apparent victory, however, Jackson came

forward with evidence of election rigging by Wayne's campaign
manager.

During the process of trying to regain his seat in the

House, Jackson encountered on a national scale the sort of
partisanship that characterized his home district, where he
represented an avid Anti-Federal point of view.

Wayne, on the
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other hand, stood squarely for the policies of the Federalist
administration, particularly as a member of the locally unpopular
"Yazoo" faction.50
The contrast between Jackson, an ardent supporter of
Madison, and Wayne, a loyal follower of the Federalist line, was
not lost on the members of Congress as they deliberated the
issue.

Right from the start, Wayne's case for retaining the seat

was so weak that the issue was not whether to retain Wayne in the
House, but whether the Federalists in the body would give the
seat back to Jackson, a disciple of Madison.51 After an aborted
Federalist motion to declare simply that Wayne "was not duly
elected a member of this House," Republican Representative
William Giles of Virginia made a motion that spelled out
Jackson's right to Wayne's seat.
29 nays.

The vote was tied, 29 yeas to

When the Speaker, Representative Jonathan Trumbull of

Connecticut, voted with the nays, Wayne's seat was declared
vacant.52
Lisle Rose notes that of the twenty-nine voting in favor
of the Giles (and Jackson) motion, a mere three were identified
by Clerk of the House John Beckley as Federalist-oriented.

On

the other hand, Beckley identified twelve of these twenty-nine
negative voters as having Federalist leanings.

As Rose says:

"Prior to Jay's Treaty the Wayne-Jackson election was the most
important popular test in the South of emerging partisan strength
on both sides.

The administration hosts had not merely been

defeated; they had been disgraced. 1,53
The Second Congress, then, had come to display partisan
aspects in its voting behavior, albeit mostly regional in nature,
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and this despite the original protestations of the most
influential politicians of the era, such as Madison and Hamilton,
who despite their declamations against the dangers of factions,
became leaders of opposing political parties.

The clash of

philosophies that had been delineated by Hamilton's financial
activities had been accelerated by current events in France, and
each controversial bill that came to a vote in the House became
an opportunity to exhibit yet more partisan voting behavior.
One would expect the incipient partisanship that had begun
to emerge in the Second House to extend to all issues that
appeared before the House.

As cluster bloc analysis will show in

the next chapter, this in general holds true, but only when
examining the business of the entire House.

As we will see,

there were still issues, such as the military future of the
nation, that did not produce particular factional unanimity when
votes were cast.
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CHAPTER SIX:

CLUSTER BLOC ANALYSIS

The members of the Second Congress were operating in a
period of looser party development than their colleagues in the
subsequent congresses of the Federalist Era.

The crises of

political conscience that came about as a result of the French
Revolution and produced two sharply delineated political entities
had not yet reached critical importance by 1791, when the
majority of the members of the Second Congress took their seats.
Even though the labels Republican and Federalist had not reached
common usage when referring to congressmen, some division on
issues had occurred, whether by local self-interest or in
opposition to Hamilton's financial programs.
While the issue of national defense in the Second Congress
does not receive the attention by historians that the
establishment of the Hamiltonian financial system or the crises
looming from across the sea do, nevertheless military concerns
are important in the period.

The struggle to establish a

national system for the militia, the effort to create a more
efficient regular army, and the resulting disagreements among
congressmen are matters that should take their place in the study
of the period with more widely recognized issues.

Despite the

somewhat nebulous political atmosphere of the Second Congress,
some grouping of congressmen can be found by using Rice-Beyle
cluster-bloc analysis.

By use of this process, some voting

86

87

patterns can be identified among congressmen, although the system
of party identification had not yet evolved into its later form.1
As an example of how scattered the voting could be at this period
in congressional development, a look at the Uniform Militia Act
of 1792 is useful.

It was passed without the crystal-clear party

definition of later congresses, but nevertheless was the most
significant legislation affecting militia for a century.

John

Mahon notes the lack of a clear voting pattern on the issue, but
there is an interesting connection between the roll call on final
passage of the bill and the personal experiences of the
individual members.2
Of the fifty-eight members of the House who voted on the
Uniform Militia Act in its final form, only nine of the
thirty-one yea voters (29 percent) had military experience of any
sort.

On the nay side, however, of the twenty-seven who voted

against the measure a significant nineteen (70 percent) had
served in some military capacity, either in the Revolution or the
French and Indian War.

Possibly some of the opposition to the

bill came from those veterans disgusted with the bill's obvious
weaknesses and lax standards of enforcement.

Certainly Jeremiah

Wadsworth, who had sponsored the bill until it was further
emasculated just before passage, did not care for it in its
eventual weakened form. Indeed, as mentioned before, Wadsworth
himself voted against it when the time came for the roll call.
Anti-administration men such as Josiah Parker of Virginia,
who had fought in such fierce battles as Trenton and Brandywine
during the Revolution, may have decided that they could not
support in good conscience an act that would lead to military

88

weakness, despite the rhetoric surrounding the theory of a
stalwart militia.

Other usual allies of Madison parted company

with him on this vote, including John Page and Samuel Griffin,
fellow Virginians, but unlike Madison, veterans of extended
campaigning during the Revolution.

As Table 1 indicates, there

was a wide voting disparity between legislators who had perhaps
had the chance to see actual fighting and those who had not.

TABLE 1
VETERANS/NON-VETERANS
VETERANS
YEA
NAY

FINAL PASSAGE OF THE UNIFORM MILITIA ACT
NON-VETERANS

TOTAL

9 (32%)
19 (68%)

22 (73%)
8 (27%)

31 (53%)
27 (47%)

28 (100%)

30 (100%)

58 (100%)

Among the supporters of the Uniform Militia Act as it
finally passed the House was North Carolina's John Steele, a
representative from a district which had had its share of Indian
troubles.3 Despite the somewhat sketchy performance of the
militia on the frontier, Steele was a firm believer in the
superiority of militia over regular armies in the western portion
of the country.

Also in the yea group on this bill was the old

Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry, who did not agree in any
appreciable way with other voting blocs in this Congress.

He

was, however, a committed opponent of the classic standing army
and a devoted adherent to the notion of a virtuous republican
militia.4 How many others thought like Gerry on this issue is
difficult to say, since not all in this Congress were as
vociferous as Gerry in expressing their opinions, but the fear of
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a liberty-threatening standing army was certainly not confined to
Gerry alone, and this attitude must have been a factor in the
decision by some of his colleagues to vote yea on the issue.
Another supporter of the Uniform Militia Act was the devout
Federalist Fisher Ames of Massachusetts.

Although Ames supported

the Frontier Bill, with its emphasis on a larger, more effective
regular army, as the way to conclude the Indian campaign, he
supported the Militia Act as a means of extending federal control
over the states.

In the words of his biographer, Winfred

Bernhard, Ames "was dubious about the effectiveness of the bill
as it stood, but voted with the majority in favor of it as he
felt the need to make a beginning even if the legislation turned
out to be feeble and poor."5 Another important congressional
leader who voted for the much-altered Militia Bill was the
redoubtable James Madison of Virginia, who, after having
supported the militia concept vociferously time and again, was
placed in the position of having to support the bill from the
necessities of his republican philosophy rather than from any
love of the bill's provisions.
Among the congressmen opposing passage of the Militia Act,
only the delegates from Georgia, all of whom were veterans of the
Revolution, voted solidly against it.

The headstrong Anthony

Wayne, of Stony Point fame, could have influenced the rest of his
state's delegation against the measure.

Wayne had been one of

the militia's most steadfast detractors in the debates prior to
passage of this and the Frontier Bill, and it is also likely that
his extensive military experience during the Revolution had led
him to a distaste for all things militia.6 Wayne may also have
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known of his candidacy for leadership of the remodeled U. S. Army
at this time, and may have sought to diminish the role of the
militia to enhance the importance of regular forces.

At any

rate, this was to be one of his last votes due to his impending
removal from the House for election improprieties.
For whatever reasons congressmen of the Second House had for
voting against the Militia Bill, the nays were split between
those whom Stanley Parsons has labeled pro-administration and
those he labels anti-administration (the terms Federalist and
Republican being not yet appropriate).7 The nays included
fifteen of the thirty-six pro-administration congressmen (42
percent) and eleven of the twenty-one anti-administration men.
Shearjashub Bourne of Massachusetts was an independent who was
the twelfth nay on this measure.

Of those representatives who

voted in favor of the bill as it was sent to the Senate,
twenty-one (58 percent) were what Parsons calls
pro-administration in their voting sentiments, and ten (45
percent) were what he calls anti-administration in policy.
However, the single vote on final passage provides only weak
basis for any definitive conclusions.

Table 2 illustrates the

final vote on the Uniform Militia Act.

TABLE 2
UNIFORM MILITIA ACT
HOUSE VOTE, FINAL PASSAGE
PRO-ADMINISTRATION
Yea
Nay

21 (58%)
15 (42%)
36 (100%)

ANTI-ADMINISTRATION
10 (45%)
12 (55%)
22

Includes one Independent, Bourne, Mass.

( 100 %)

TOTAL
31 (53%)
27 (47%)
58 (100%)
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When all eleven defense-related roll calls of the Second
Congress under consideration are analyzed together using
Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis at a minimum index of agreement
of seventy per cent, two blocs emerge.

However, analysis of

these blocs indicated that this was the wrong approach.

Lumping

together all eleven votes obscured more than it revealed, and
indicated primarily that most representatives did not see the
militia issue and the frontier regiments issue as closely
connected problems.

Rather, roll-call voting behavior indicates

that congressmen saw two issues where the modern researcher,
having full benefit of hindsight, thought perhaps there was
really only one issue--military defense.

Whereas two small blocs

emerged from analysis of all eleven defense related votes, a more
distinct pattern emerged when the defense votes were divided into
two groups for analysis:

frontier votes and militia votes.

By

organizing the votes into these two subject areas, a small, but
interesting, pattern of voting appeared.

Since seven members of

the House were either not present or not voting except during a
couple of the roll calls under consideration, these men were
eliminated from the analysis.

Also, the fringe members that

appeared when the votes were split into two subject areas are not
included in the tabulations.

(Due to the small number of votes

examined, the number of fringe members was too small to be of
consequence.

The fringe members for the total business of the

Second Congress, however, are included in Appendix F to give a
general feeling of where their voting sympathies lay.)8
Table 3 examines the voting alliances found when considering
the six militia related votes.

The militia was a form of
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national defense which many saw as both the preservation of the
republican way of life and as a means of countering potential
Federalist encroachment on state and private liberties.

What is

most interesting is the way the "Regular Bloc" (Bloc One,
generally favoring regular forces as the means of the nation's
defense) is composed almost totally of pro-administration
congressmen (84 percent), with only one administration opponent,
and a second labeled an independent by Parsons.

While several of

the members of this bloc were warm theoretical supporters of a
well-trained militia, this group in general followed the
Federalist line in seeking a more effective response to the
nation's military problems.

The Militia Bloc, Bloc 2, includes

such pro-militia stalwarts as James Madison and John Steele, and
is markedly anti-administration in makeup (75 percent).

TABLE 3
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION
MILITIA ISSUE, SIX RELATED VOTES
(#4,5,6,8,10,11)
BLOCK 1:
PRO-REGULAR

BLOCK 2:
PRO-MILITIA

PRO-ADMIN

10 (83%)

2 (25%)

12 (60%)

ANTI-ADMIN

2 (17%)

6 (75%)

8 (40%)

12 (100%)

8 (100%)

20 (100%)

TOTAL

* Includes one Independent, Bourne, Massachusetts, so labeled by
Parsons, et al. The Biographical Directory of American Congress
does not identify him as belonging to any party. In this, as in
all tables, percentages may not equal 100 due to the effects of
rounding. See Appendix A for a listing of the roll calls, and
Appendix D for a list of bloc members.
Table 4 indicates the divisions that appear when the
question of a stronger regular military force on the nation's
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frontier came to a vote in the Second Congress.

The members of

the "pro-Frontier" bloc do not seem to be as dogmatic in their
voting patterns, due to the nature of the country's problems on
the frontier.

Pro-administration members are the majority in

both blocs on the frontier issue, underscoring the point that the
legislators were not bound to a political consistency on this
matter.

Although militia had come to grief on the frontier

during the St. Clair and Harmar campaigns, the seeming necessity
of defending states with exposed frontiers with regular troops
did not seem to override most of the anti-administration
representatives' fears of an overbearing standing army.
Congressmen Steele and Ashe of North Carolina, men from a state
with a very real possibility of Indian attack, joined the other
congressmen in the Frontier roll call bloc which opposed an

TABLE 4
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION
FRONTIER ISSUE, FIVE RELATED VOTES
(#1,2,3,7,9)
BLOCK 1:
PRO-FRONTIER

BLOCK 2:
ANTI-FRONTIER

PRO-ADMIN

7 (58%)

11 (85%)

18 (72%)

ANTI-ADMIN

5 (42%)

2 (15%)

7 (28%)

13 (100%)

25 (100%:

12 (100%)

TOTAL

* Bourne of Massachusetts again sided with the anti-Admin faction
on this issue. See Appendix E for list of bloc members.
enlarged regular army, disputing the administration's claims of
the need for such an army.
Another possible influence on voting patterns that could
serve to explain potential divisions is section.

In Table 5, a

94

strong sectional pattern is apparent in the bloc voting on the
militia bills.

The two blocs are equally clannish.

The ten

representatives of Bloc Two, the pro-Militia bloc, include only
two congressmen from the North, Abraham Clark of New Jersey and
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire.

The idea of a "Solid South”

at this time is offset, however, by the presence of three
southerners, all from South Carolina, in the pro-administration
bloc.

William Loughton Smith of South Carolina was one of the

budding stars of Federalism at this time, and his commercial and
political aspirations behooved him to toe the Federalist party
line; he probably influenced his comrades Barnwell and Huger to
vote with him as well.9

TABLE 5
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION
MILITIA ISSUE
BLOCK 1:
PRO-REGULAR

BLOCK 2:
PRO-MILITIA

TOTAL

NORTH

10 (83%)

1 (12%)

11 (55%)

SOUTH

2 (17%)

7 (88%)

9 (45%)

12 (100%)

8 (100%)

20 (100%)

FRONTIER

0 (0%)

6 (75%)

6 (30%)

SETTLED

12 (100%)

2 (25%)

14 (70%)

8 (100%)

20 (100%)

12 (100%)

Another sectional division may have been between east and
west, or, more precisely, frontier versus settled areas.

At this

time the frontier would include not only western parts of larger
states, but also the Maine district of Massachusetts, Vermont,
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New Hampshire, and Georgia.

As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, the

number of frontier congressmen voting in either bloc on defense
bills are slight in this Congress, and their meager vote is split
on the militia issue.

The reason for this situation is

that the

frontier congressmen were too few in number to be effectively
heard at this time, since the Atlantic seaboard was still the
dominant political force in the country.

It would be difficult

to reach any firm conclusions, but one should note a tendency for
the frontier congressmen to be more oriented toward militia than
regulars.

Whether such congressmen accurately reflected the

feelings of their constituents, of course, is anybody's guess.
For purposes of Table 5, Pennsylvania is considered as a northern
state.

TABLE 6
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION
FRONTIER ISSUE
PRO- REGULAR

PRO-■MILITIA

NORTH

6 (46%)

7 (58%)

13 (52%)

SOUTH

7 (54%)

5 (42%)

12 (48%)

13 (100%)

12 (100%)

25 (100%)

(8%)

6 (50%)

7 (28%)

12 (92%)

6 (50%)

18 (72%)

13 (100%)

12 (100%)

25 (100%)

FRONTIER
SETTLED

1

TOTAL

Another variable that might shed some light on bloc members
voting patterns is detailed in Table Seven.

In Table 1 House

members who are veterans show a marked tendency to vote against
the Uniform Militia Act, possibly due to the weakness of the
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measure.

In Table 7, however, when examining the relatively tiny

voting blocs that are the members who vote in definite groups on
military matters, no dramatic pattern emerges.

A good reason for

this lack of a vivid voting contrast might be that most of the
other military bills that the members of the Second House faced
were not so obviously flawed or as emotionally charged as the
Uniform Militia Act, and thus did not bring out strong feelings
by veterans in the House.

TABLE 7
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY VETERAN STATUS
MILITIA ISSUE
PRO- REGULAR

PRO-■MILITIA

VETERAN

6 (50%)

3 (38%)

9 (45%)

NON-VETERAN

6 (50%)

5 (62%)

11 (55%)

12 (100%)

8 (100%)

20 (100%)

TOTAL

FRONTIER ISSUE
PRO- FRONTIER

ANTI-•FRONTIER

VETERAN

6 (50%)

5 (38%)

11 (44%)

NON-VETERAN

6 (50%)

8 (62%)

14 (56%)

12 (100%)

13 (100%)

25 (100%)

TOTAL

The lack of a consensus in congressional voting on military
issues becomes more apparent when viewed in the light of the
overall voting business of the Second House.

In contrast to the

relatively miniature voting blocs that occurred on the military
issues of the Second Congress, cluster-bloc analysis of the
entire House of Representatives for this period showed that, when
members had at least thirty mutual votes, they tended to fall
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into distinct, recognizable voting patterns.

As is apparent in

Table 8, the anti-administration faction had the overall strength
to be a significant influence in the deliberations of the Second
Congress.

TABLE 8
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY FACTION, SECOND CONGRESS
TOTAL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION
CONGRESSMEN*

ANTI-ADMINISTRATION
CONGRESSMEN

TOTAL

ADMIN BLOC

12 ( 27%)

0 (

0%)

12 ( 17%)

ADMIN FRINGE

11 ( 24%)

2 (

7%)

13 ( 18%)

TOTAL ADMIN
ATTITUDE

23 ( 51%)

2 (

7%)

25 ( 35%)

ANTI-ADMIN BLOC

4 (

9%)

10 ( 37%)

14 ( 19%)

ANTI-ADMIN FRINGE

3 (

6%)

7 ( 26%)

10 ( 14%)

TOTAL ANTI-ADMIN
ATTITUDE

7 ( 15%)

17 ( 63%)

24 ( 33%)

BLOC TOTALS
NON-BLOC
MEMBERS

30 ( 67%)

19 ( 70%)

49 ( 68%)

15 ( 33%)

8 ( 30%)

23 ( 32%)

TOTAL

45 (100%)

27 (100%)

72 (100%)

* As Appendix F shows, Congressman Shearjashub Bourne of
Massachusetts voted with the Administration at least 70 percent
of the time on issues before the House. Therefore he is included
here in the Administration faction here despite his designation
by Parsons as an Independent.
Table 8 shows the extent to which partisan voting behavior
had begun to emerge in the House of Representatives during the
Second Congress.

Significantly, 68 percent of the 72 members

voted either as members of a bloc or as members of an associated
fringe.

This is particularly striking when one considers the

98

constant flux in membership that this House experienced.

Due to

Kentucky's admission to the Union in June 1792, the two members
from Kentucky did not take their seats until half the term of the
Second Congress had been completed.

This and such factors as

illness and family problems, not to mention Anthony Wayne's
forced departure from his seat in the House, resulted in nine
members of the Second Congress not serving a complete term.10
When one applies a consistent agreement threshold of 70 percent
for inclusion in a voting bloc and requires at least 30 mutual
votes out of the 102 total votes of this House, cluster-bloc
analysis reveals a surprising degree of voting polarity on the
total business of the Second Congress.

Nevertheless, the

relatively low state of party development that characterized the
Second House explains why a full 32 percent of this House's
members do not fit into either a bloc or fringe.

The fact that

such a large number of legislators did not yet regularly vote in
easily definable blocs also goes a long way toward accounting for
the relatively small bloc numbers and negligible fringes found in
the roll-call record on the militia and frontier bills as
separate entities.

By narrowing the pool of votes from 102 to

groupings of five and six, the possibility of excluding voting
partners jumps significantly.
One evidence that members of the Anti-administration faction
were beginning to band together is the low level of crossover
voting that appears in Table 8.

After all the votes of the

Second House are considered it becomes apparent that the
opposition had begun to solidify.

Particularly good evidence

that Fisher Ames was correct in his assertion that "Virginia
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moves in a solid column" can be seen in Appendix F, where the
entire Virginia delegation appears, dominating the
Anti-administration faction.11 The increasingly sectional nature
of voting behavior is obvious here and in the fringe group for
the anti-administration faction.

In this appendix no northerner

save William Findley of Pennsylvania appears as a member of the
anti-administration faction, and only two Pennsylvania
legislators and one New Yorker side consistently with the
opposition.

With the exception of some of the South Carolina

delegation, most of the southern members had begun to follow
Madison's lead in opposing Federalist legislative measures, and
Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis makes this deepening sectional
division dramatically apparent.
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CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION

As the Second Congress closed it could look back on having
created the foundation of the American military establishment for
the next century.

In the Frontier Bill, or Five-Regiment Act, it

had created the precedent for an expanded regular army to bear
the brunt of the nation's military demands.

In the Uniform

Militia Act of 1792, it had continued the American tradition of
paying lip service to the concept of a militia comprised of the
average citizen, ready at a moment's notice to defend home and
hearth.

Although some of the supporters of the Uniform Militia

Act did not realize it at the time they sent the measure to the
Senate, the bill accelerated the decline of the militia system in
the nation.

Both the passage of the Frontier Bill and the

Uniform Militia Act were hastened by the disasters which had
beset the sloppily organized military campaigns of Harmar and St.
Clair on the northwest frontier.
The coincidental appearance before the House of both the
Uniform Militia Act and the Frontier Bill served to point up the
philosophical differences present among members of the House
concerning military matters.

While the militia bill had lingered

in committee for almost two years before coming out for public
debate, the Frontier Bill was spawned out of the necessity for a
more solid regular military force to defend the outer reaches of
United States territory.

The two bills became intertwined in the
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discussions of military matters by congressmen, as supporters of
the militia would refer to sinister implications of the Frontier
Bill for the nation's future, while supporters of a more
efficient military would point out the obvious flaws in the
militia plan.
The passage of the Frontier Bill resulted after often bitter
accusations by states-rights congressmen that the federal
government was using the measure to rob the citizens of their
freedoms.1 Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania voiced his
disgust with the bill when he said "the business of the militia
stands still, and the Military Establishment bill is passed with
all the art and address of ministerial management."2 Mindful of
the excesses of the recent colonial past, some men feared the use
of a "standing army" to pacify the Indian tribes of the frontier.
Many felt that the enlargement of the regular army was an attempt
to strip away the hard-won liberties of the people.

The

high-toned Federalist Fisher Ames would have not allayed such
men's fears if they had known his private opinions on how to
handle the Indian military dilemma.

Noting that some of the

back-country people were "averse to regulars" Ames noted an
advantage to sending regulars to the West:

"so many troops there

will look as if government could not be resisted, and the excise
perhaps less trifled with."3 This reference to the resistance by
some to Hamilton's tax programs indicates that there may have
been some basis to Republican fears of Federalist intentions.
In the end, the need for effective protection of the
outlying regions of United States territory outweighed the
objections of the adversaries of the Frontier Bill.

As shown by
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cluster-bloc analysis (Table 4), the coherence of the blocs
favoring and opposing the enlargement of federal military might
is not tightly confined to geographical groupings.

While it

would seem that such men as John Steele and John Baptista Ashe
would uniformly support a powerful force to defend their
potentially exposed frontier areas, such was not always the case.
In Steele's case, his personal preference for the militia concept
led him to oppose a larger, more expensive regular army after
pondering the huge cost of the expanded army.4

Steele's advocacy

of the militia as opposed to regular troops did not set well with
his constituents
confederacy.

on the edge of a still powerful southern Indian

According to Kemp Plummer Battle, the editor of

Steele's papers, "Mr. Steele's cause in moving to reduce the
army, being perverted into indifference to the sufferings of the
frontiersmen from Indian hostilities, probably caused his defeat
for the 3rd Congress."5
The urgency of creating a force capable of opposing the
Indian military coalition was paramount, while President
Washington and Secretary of War Knox bought time by pursuing a
policy of negotiation with the Indian tribes.

After the defeat

of St. Clair's army in November 1791, the regular army consisted
of only scattered fragments, many of which were needed to
garrison

widely scattered forts on the frontier.

Without a

much-strengthened and well-trained regular army, offensive
operations against the Indian forces would be impossible, since
militia forces had proved unmanageable on extended campaigns.6
After the passage of the Five Regiment bill enlarging the
regular army, progress toward a more effective regular military
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force proceeded slowly and inexorably.

Rather than squander his

forces in a hasty, ill-planned campaign as his predecessors had
done, the newly-appointed Commander of the Legion of the United
States Anthony Wayne, contrary to his "Mad" title, took nearly
two years to train and equip his men properly before using them
in a march against the northwest tribes.

With careful planning

and strict precautions against ambush, Wayne was able to break
the military power of the Wabash Indians at the Battle of Fallen
Timbers in August 1794.

This smashing victory ended years of

military frustration and disgrace for the new nation, years which
had seen five out of every six government dollars spent on the
war in the West, with disastrously meager returns.7 The Indian
tribes of the frontier had expected their former allies, the
British, to assist them logistically and militarily in their
efforts against Wayne.

That aid was not forthcoming due to the

obviously revitalized and aggressive American military presence
on the frontier, and the Indians signed the Treaty of Greenville
in 1795. The regular army had proved its worth.
The passage of the Frontier Act began a trend that continued
until World War I, that of expanding the country's regular forces
to meet permanent defense requirements and relying on the regular
army plus volunteers to shoulder the load of extended campaigns
against other countries.

Except for the War of 1812, militia saw

little duty other than short-term Indian conflicts before the
Civil War and occasional strike duty after.

A cynical person

might also say that the act is also part of a trend of using a
military crisis to justify the enlargement of the military and
its role in the nation's policy development.
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With the Uniform Militia Act, the denouement was not so
satisfying to supporters of the militia concept.

As some had

predicted, the bill received very uneven application in the
different states, as some states required a vigorous, active
militia, while others, less exposed to danger, felt militia
service more a nuisance than a necessity.

Those states which had

always had a strong tradition of militia service, such as
Massachusetts, provided substantial penalties for non-compliance
with militia requirements.

For example, men who appeared on

muster days without arms were liable to be lent out to a term of
service specified by the selectmen of the town.8 For the same
offense, Maryland fined the unarmed man a mere one cent per day,
while Pennsylvania had no fines or punishment for appearing
without arms.

North Carolina gave local militia leaders the

option of loaning weapons to those unable to bring their own,
provided they returned them after drill was complete.9
In 1794, a committee of the Third Congress considered
amending the Uniform Militia Act because of complaints regarding
its effectiveness, but hesitated to act, as did all other
congresses until the end of the nineteenth century.

The

committee said that since the "right of training the militia is
constitutionally reserved to the States, if they can be impressed
with the importance of exercising this power, and directing its
operation, more especially to the light infantry, an efficient
force may be thereby created, and equal to any that can probably
be obtained by any additional law of the United States, made
under the constitutional powers of Congress."

The committee

concluded that no further amendment was necessary to the act
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pending further experience with it.10 Although proposals to
reform the act would reappear from time to time, the congressmen
would not act on them due to the sticky nature of the problem of
universal military obligation.11
According to Theodore Sedgwick's report to Congress in 1794,
the total of the militia available from the states amounted to
approximately 80,000 men, with Massachusetts, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania providing over 30,000 of this total.12

This force,

at least on paper, dwarfed the 3,629 regulars on duty at the
time.13 While the enormous paper army of militia could not
possibly possess anywhere near the fighting strength suggested by
Sedgwick's statistics, due to inconsistent training and arming,
there is perhaps some credence to Jim Dan Hill's assertion that
the Uniform Militia Act was never intended to produce a uniformly
effective field army, but rather to serve as a means of
registering able-bodied men for potential active duty.14
At any rate, the Uniform Militia Act did not prove to be the
instrument originally envisioned by Henry Knox that would provide
a place where young Americans could learn a "glorious national
spirit" and absorb noble personal characteristics that would make
them better citizens.15 Writing in 1794, Knox acknowledged the
flaws in the final product, especially the requirement for each
man to provide his own firearm:

"The militia are requested to

arm and equip themselves, at their own expense; but there is no
penalty to enforce the injunction of the law. 1,16 Knox noted the
danger of the shortage of arms (about 5,000) for the militia
during the Whiskey Rebellion:

"The late experiment proves, at

least in some parts, that the laws were inefficient, and had it
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not been for voluntary zeal, which came to its aid, the community
might have experienced great evils."17
Knox never retreated from his position that only by having
an elite, mobile force comprised of socially expendable citizens
able to rush to trouble spots could the nation have a workable
militia system.

Writing to Congress in 1794, Knox offered a

forlorn hope that the Uniform Militia Act could be modified to
realize his concept of a select force within the mass of the
militia:

"Whether the act in question is susceptible of such

attention and amendments, on its present principles, as will
secure the advantages to be derived from a well-organized
militia, or whether a limited, but select, and efficient corps of
militia, formed on a principle of rotation, or otherwise, and
taken from the classes least injurious to the industry of the
community, would not better fulfill that object, and at the same
time better comport with economy are questions which the wisdom
of Congress alone is competent to decide."18 As Frederick Bernays
Wiener notes, not until the Dick Act of 1903 and the National
Defense Act of 1916 would Congress act to reorganize the nation's
militia plan into a practical system.19
The War of 1812 provided evidence of how the rhetoric about
the militia differed from the reality.

Conflicts over how the

militia should be used created militarily untenable situations at
times.

Some militia conveniently reverted to the British notion

of militia as purely defensive, and at inopportune times.

At the

battle of Queenston in October 1812, the militia contingent
refused to cross the Niagara River into Canada, and watched their
regular army comrades get slaughtered by British forces.20
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Further evidence of the unsuitability of hastily assembled
militia came when 4,400 men gathered from the community met
British regulars outside Washington, D.C. The resulting rout
("the Bladensburg Races") swept up several in the administration,
including, ironically, then-President James Madison.21

The raw

militia of the country was spared embarrassment during the
Mexican War since it "was fought on foreign soil, and therefore
it was not possible to call up the militia which claimed
constitutional immunity against being used as an invading
force."22 As a result, the war was fought mostly with regulars,
although many individual members of the state militias saw duty
in Mexico.
The Civil War dramatically showed the shortcomings of what
George Washington once called "a mistaken dependence on the
militia;" the initial campaign of the war had to be fought with
militia, which by law could not be called into federal service
for more than three months.23 One unwanted effect of this use of
militia was the untimely departure of some of the Union soldiers
during the midst of the battle of Bull Run when their obligation
had expired.

According to Galloway, "the failure of the state

militia system led to the draft."24
When I originally approached the problem of analyzing the
Second Congress' military roll calls through cluster bloc
analysis, I expected that the voting patterns would break down
into neat segments that would reflect obvious voting tendencies.
Unfortunately, the period's lack of party development complicated
the matter.

Since the great foreign crises with France and

England that would serve to accelerate political cleavage had not
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yet reached fever pitch, congressmen tended to vote in ways that
defied the polarization of each subsequent Congress.
Analysis of all 102 votes and all House members makes
apparent the general trend toward sectional voting that was at
work in the Second Congress.

Federalist New Englanders, led by

the redoubtable Fisher Ames and Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts, and assisted in part by a few sympathetically
oriented South Carolinians, voted in a bloc opposed regularly by
the other Southern and Mid-Atlantic states.

The Virginians, led

by James Madison, voted consistently with several North
Carolinians and Pennsylvanians overall, usually taking what would
soon be called the Republican position.

In this movement toward

regional political identification were the seeds for far more
dangerous disagreements in the nation's future.
Within the fringes of both groups, however, were independent
thinkers, such as the notably quirky Elbridge Gerry, who voted on
issues according to the dictates of their whim, rather than
following a designated party line.

While such men would have

bedeviled the serenity of potential party leaders, their presence
is a factor not found as often in later congresses, when parties
had coalesced into solid entities.

The independence of men such

as Gerry and the various members appointed to fill seats vacated
due to illness or personal problems must be considered as a
factor also when noting the relatively small voting blocs
developed on

militia and frontier issues.

Using the seventy percent agreement level used throughout
the analysis, the six militia roll calls produced a strong
Federalist bloc.

This group voted regularly in support of
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administration measures, and includes several members of what
could be called the master bloc of Federalist congressmen.

The

bloc which opposed them was composed primarily of Virginians and
North Carolinians, who voted on militia measures in a manner
calculated to preserve the sanctity of state sovereignty over the
militia and prevent the encroachment of federal power on personal
liberties.
The fact that voting on the Uniform Militia Act itself
combines members of the Federalist bloc with a few of the
opposition bloc attests to the scrambled appeal of the bill, and
the strength of the cross pressures created by two different
(though similar) issues.

Strong supporters of the militia, such

as Madison and Steele, favored a sturdy militia, while strong
Federalists, such as Ames and William Loughton Smith, favored an
extension of federal authority and control over the state
militia. Thus, some intersection occurred between blocs on the
militia vote itself.
Another factor that must have been at play when men were
making their voting choices in the Second House was whether a
member had seen military service of some sort.

Despite all the

rhetoric about the virtues of a Saxon-like militia, members who
had actually seen combat could not, for the most part, bring
themselves to vote for the Uniform Militia Act.

Table One shows

the difference between veterans and non-veterans on this point,
with 68 percent of the members who had been exposed to the
realities of war voting against the haphazard militia bill.
While the same striking contrast does not occur between veterans
and non-veterans when they are examined in voting blocs, few

Ill
combat veterans voiced more than token acknowledgement to the
concept of a militia.

Most, especially hard-bitten soldiers like

Anthony Wayne and Artemas Ward, sneered at the idea of militia
ever being anything more than cannon fodder.

Interestingly, one

of the most vigorous proponents of the militia concept was James
Madison, whose experiences with untrained troops years later at
the Battle of Bladensburg would provide further fuel to
detractors of the militia.
On votes dealing with the issue of a stronger federal army,
which I grouped together as Frontier votes, there is less
cohesion in the voting blocs.

Rather than groups that link

together by region or party, the blocs take on a more random form
than on the militia issue.

The apparently scattered nature of

the voting blocs is attributable to the variety of interests
facing the congressmen on this issue.

Some men, such as Ashe and

Steele of North Carolina, were in the position of needing a
military presence near their home districts due to the Indian
threat, and voted for a stronger regular military although their
hearts lay with the militia.

Others, such as Artemas Ward, who

had led militia during the first exciting days of the Revolution,
voted for a stronger regular army out of a belief in a more
powerful and effective federal military.

The issue of a more

potent regular army on the frontier seems to have been one that
transcended future party lines and came down to the personal
beliefs of the individual members.
The members of the Second Congress passed several bills that
have influence to this day.

The Frontier Bill established a

precedent of massive defense expenditures for the nation which
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has continued periodically since then.

The Uniform Militia Act,

although ineffective and soon relegated to obscurity, continued
the philosophical tradition of the citizen soldier that had been
in place since the Jamestown and Plymouth settlements and remains
with us to this day.

By enacting this legislation, the Second

Congress perpetuated the notion, or myth, of the sturdy citizen
who would spring to arms in his country's defense at a moments'
notice.

As the nation's leading military historian, Russell F.

Weigley, put it, "The Militia Act of 1792 was not useless; it
preserved if it did not improve the inherited tradition of a
citizen soldiery, and that tradition was to assist the nation
often in future years."25
The issue of how the Uniform Militia Act was passed remains
something of a mystery.

For months at a time after its

introduction to the House it lay on the shelf in committee,
rarely emerging for discussion until the St. Clair disaster
prompted renewed interest in things military.

A future

researcher might do well to track in detail the passage of the
bill from its introduction in 1790 until its passage in 1792.

Of

even more interest might be either proving or disproving Richard
Kohn's suggestion that the final passage of the Uniform Militia
Act in its watered-down form was actually a clever attempt by the
Federalists to destroy the existing state militia systems of the
country.

The notion is an intriguing one, but concrete evidence

might prove difficult to obtain, since any conspirators in such a
plot are long dead and naturally would have been stealthy in
their activities.

It is curious that the Federalists, who

espoused a strong military, allowed what was previously a
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vigorous, if uneven, state militia system to atrophy into
insignificance.
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APPENDIX A
DEFENSE RELATED ROLL CALLS IN THE SECOND CONGRESS

Roll Call 1
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR v a r i a b l e number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 2
Date:
Measure:

January 30,1792
To amend H. R. 162, a bill to
make further and more effectual
provision for the protection of
the frontiers of the United
States by eliminating the
second section which provides
for the raising of three
additional regiments of
infantry.
This amendment would eliminate the
expense of equipping and arming
about 3,000 regular soldiers for
the nation's defense by not
raising them.
Yea 18, Nay 34.
H. R. 162 comes to a vote in its
original form, which provides
for an expanded regular army for
the defense of the frontier.
Annals, 354; Journal, 2H, IS, 87.
HO21014
Card 1, column 46.
A nay vote would indicate approval
of the enlargement of the regular
army for the defense of the
frontier.
February 1, 1792
To pass H. R. 162, a bill to make
further and more effectual
provision for the protection of
the frontiers of the United
States.

Issue:

T h i s bill, s o m e t i m e s r e f e r r e d to
as "The F r o n t i e r B i l l , " w o u l d
a u t h o r i z e t h e r a i s i n g of t h r e e
a d d i t i o n a l r e g i m e n t s of r e g u l a r
i n f a n t r y for u s e in the In d i a n w a r
then raging.
This w o u l d b r i n g the
s t r e n g t h of t h e U. S. A r m y to a
t o t a l of f i v e r e g i m e n t s .

Vote:
Result:

Y e a 29, N a y 19.
A shift b e g a n in A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y
policy towards a much greater
r e l i a n c e o n r e g u l a r t r o o p s in t h e
Indian c a m p a i g n s .

116

117

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 3
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Annals. 355. Journal, 2H, IS, 500.
H021015
Card 1, Column 47.
A yea vote would indicate approval
of the enlargement of the regular
army for the defense of the
frontier and a more efficient
approach to the nation's defense,
despite the greatly increased
cost of maintaining this force.
The vote on this issue placed some
of the members in the position of
choosing between their fear of a
larger regular military force and
the need for a more disciplined
army to defend a frontier exposed
to attack by General St. Clair's
rout.
February 28, 1792
A motion to disagree to the Senate
amendment to H. R. 162, which
would strike out the fourteenth
section which grants exclusive
authority to the President to
appoint officers.
The motion in question voices
House desire to restore the
President's power to appoint
officers to the force being
raised for the defense of the
frontiers. The House wants the
President to have the power to
appoint officers in the interim
between sessions of Congress; the
Senate had killed this provision.
Yea 43, Nay 9. The House
disagrees to the proposed
amendment of the Senate.
The House affirms the right of the
President to make interim
appointments of officers to the
three additional regiments being
raised for the defense of the
frontier.
Annals, 430; Journal, 2H, IS, 117.
H021025
Card 1, column 57.
A yea vote would indicate approval
of the enlargement of the regular
army, or at least executive
appointment of officers; it would
also indicate that a delay in
raising the regiments would not be
"consistent with the public
safety."
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Roll Call 4
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

March 6, 1792
To pass H. R. 102, the Uniform
Militia Act (also referred to in
the ICPSR data as H. R. 148) to
more effectually provide for the
national defense, by establishing
a uniform militia throughout the
United States.
This bill would require each
able-bodied white male between the
ages of eighteen and forty-five to
enroll in a state militia within
one year from the time the bill
became law. Further, each man
was required to arm and equip
himself according to the act's
requirements.
Yea 31, Nay 27.
The much-modified Uniform Militia
Act is approved by the House.
Annals, 435; Journal. 2H, IS. 125.
H021026
Card 1, column 58.
A yea vote would be cast by a

congressman who wished to see a
militia act of some sort to
standardize state forces and
to develop a potentially strong
army. However, several
representatives who voted for the
bill expressed reservations about its
weaknesses.
Roll Call 5
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR v a riab le number:
I C P S R locat i o n :

April 12, 1792
A motion to amend H. R. 102, an
act to more effectually provide
for the national defense by
establishing a uniform militia
throughout the country by
extending the authority of the
President to call up the
militia in emergencies.
The amendment would empower the
President to call forth the
militia "to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions."
Yea 37, nay 20.
The President's power to call out
the state militia in emergencies
is enhanced.
Annals, 552; Journal. 2H, IS, 183.
H021050
Card 2, column 35.
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Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 6
Date :
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 7
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:

A yea vote would be cast by a
representative who felt that the
President needed the flexibility
of placing the militia under
national service in a sudden
crisis. It would indicate support
for a strong, effective militia.
April 12, 1792
A motion to amend H. R. 102, a
bill to establish a uniform
militia, by extending the
President's authority to
call up the militia and to provide
punishment for refusing to obey
orders while in the service.
The amendment would provide a
heavy fine or court-martial for a
militia member who refused an
order while in federal service.
Yea 24, Nay 37.
The provision of H. R. 102 that
would levy stiff penalties on
disobedient state militia in
federal service is disagreed to by
the House.
Annals, 555; Journal, 2H, IS, 184.
H21051
Card 2, column 36.
A yea vote would be cast by a
Representative who desired to
support federal authority, even
at the expense of state authority.
April 19, 1792
To amend H. R. 162, a bill to
raise a further sum of money for
the protection of the frontiers by
increasing the duty on imported
hemp and cordage and to revive all
duties previously exempted.
The amendment would strike out
imported cotton from articles
exempted from duty. This issue
moved the focus of the debate from
the protection of the frontier to
a discussion of the merits of
Southern cotton.
Yea 32, Nay 31. The Speaker
declared himself with the nays.
The question was lost.
The raising of further revenues
for the protection of the
frontiers would have to come from
other sources than the proposed
plan.
Annals, 562; Journal, 2H, IS, 191.
H021052
Card 2, column 37.
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Attitudinal position:

Roll Call
Date:
Measure:

A yea vote would be cast by a
congressman who would like to see
a duty placed on imported cotton,
thus protecting Southern cotton
and financing the protection of
the frontiers. The voting broke
down into a strong North-South
sectional voting pattern.

8

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR v a r i a b l e number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

November 21, 1792
To pass the resolution to
a committee to bring
repeal the clause of
law which relates to
of the same.

appoint
in a bill to
the militia
the arming

C o n g r e s s m a n M u r r a y of M a r y l a n d

protested that the clause which
required each militia member to
provide his own firearm was unjust
and unfairly burdened those
members of society who could least
afford their own arms.
Yea 6, Nay 50.
The requirement for each member of
the militia to provide his own
firearm continues unchanged.
Annals, 710. Journal, 2H, 2S, 20.
H022001
Card 2, column 46.
A nay v o t e w o u l d be cast

by a

congressman who would not want to
make the Congress accountable for
arming vast numbers of state
militia. The issue became one of
fiscal concern rather than an
attempt to weaken the militia.
Roll Call 9
Date:
Measure:

December 18, 1792
To pass a resolution that the
U. S. be authorized to employ such
part of the military force and
militia as required for the
protection of the frontiers and,
if necessary, to carry on
offensive operations against the
five lower Cherokee towns.

Issue:

The r e s o l u t i o n w o u l d a l l o w the use

Vote:
Result:

of the regular army or militia not
only to defend the frontier,
but also to take the offensive
against some of the Southern
tribes.
Yea 21, Nay 27.
Offensive action against the
Indian tribes of the South is
delayed.

Location:
I CPSR v a r i a b l e number:
ICPSR location:

Annals, 749. Journal, no entry.
H022005
Card 2, column 50.
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Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 10
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 11
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

A yea vote would be cast by a
congressman in favor of the use of
federal or state forces in a
destructive offensive campaign
against Indians.
January 8, 1793
To amend the resolution to reduce
the military establishment.
The amendment would set a specific
pattern for the reduction of the
military forces of the United States.
Yea 26, Nay 32.
The main resolution for reduction
of the country's military
establishment remains undiluted.
Annals, 802. Journal, 2H, 2S, 72.
H022008
Card 2, column 53.
A nay vote would reflect a
congressman's general
dissatisfaction with the bill for
reduction of the nation's
military, and would indicate
support for a strong army. The
voting pattern on this vote
closely resembles that of the
main vote that immediately
follows it.
January 8, 1793
To pass the resolution to appoint
a committee to prepare a bill to
reduce the military establishment
and to repeal the act for the
further protection of the
frontiers.
The proposal put forth by Mr.
Steele of North Carolina would
significantly reduce the number of
regular troops in the U. S. Army,
making the frontier more dependent
on the militia for defense. The
measure would save the nation
a great deal of money in defense
costs.
Yea 20, Nay 36.
Reliance on regular forces remains
the dominant means of defense.
Annals, 802. Journal, 2H, 2S, 73.
H022009
Card 2, column 54.
A yea vote indicates a desire to
rely on militia as the principal
deterrent military force in the
nation. In the often florid
debate that preceded the vote, the
merits and failings of militia
through the country's history were
discussed hotly.
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Roll Calls one, two, three, seven, and nine were analyzed
together as Frontier votes, since they primarily involved the use
of regular troops or the extension of federal authority over the
use of the nation's defense forces.
Roll Calls four, five, six, eight, ten, and eleven were analyzed as
Militia votes, since they dealt with militia forces.

APPENDIX B
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SECOND CONGRESS, 1791-1793
Representative

Partv1

State

Ames, Fisher
Ashe, John Baptista
Baldwin, Abraham
Barnwell, Robert
Benson, Egbert
Boudinot, Elias
Bourne, Shearjashub
Bourn, Benjamin
Brown, John
Clark, Abraham
Dayton, Jonathan
Findley, William
Fitzsimmons, Thomas
Gerry, Elbridge
Giles, William B.
Gilman, Nicholas
Goodhue, Benjamin
Gordon, James
Greenup, Christopher
Gregg, Andrew
Griffin, Samuel
Grove, William Barry
Hartley, Thomas
Hiester, Daniel
Hillhouse, James
Hindman, William
Huger, Daniel
Jacobs, Israel
Key, Philip
Kitchell, Aaron
Kittera, John
Laurance, John
Learned, Amasa
Lee, Richard Bland
Leonard, George
Livermore, Samuel
Macon, Nathaniel
Madison, James
Mercer, John Francis
Milledge, John
Moore, Andrew
Muhlenberg, Frederick Augustus
Murray, William Vans

Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Independent
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad

Mass.
N.C.Car
Gel.
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s.c.

N. Y.
N. J.
Mass.
R. I ..
Va.
N. J.
N. J.
Pa.
Pa.
Mass.
Va.
N.H.
Mass.
N. Y.
Ky.
Pa.
Va.
N.C.
Pa.
Pa.
Conn.
Md.
S.C.
Pa.
Md.
N. J.
Pa.
N. Y.
Conn.
Va.
Mass.
N.H.
N.C.
Va.
Md.
Gel.
Va.
Pa.
Md.
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Niles, Nathaniel
Orr, Alexander
Page, John
Parker, Josiah
Pinkney, William
Schoonmaker, Cornelius C.
Sedgwick, Theodore
Seney, Joshua
Sheridine, Upton
Silvester, Peter
Smith, Israel
Smith, Jeremiah
Smith, William Loughton
Steele, John
Sterett, Samuel
Sturges, Jonathan
Sumter, Thomas
Thacher, George
Tredwell, Thomas
Trumbull, Jonathan
Tucker, Thomas Tudor
Venable, Abraham
Vining, John
Wadsworth, Jeremiah
Ward, Artemas
Wayne, Anthony
White, Alexander
Williamson, Hugh
Willis, Francis

A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad

Vt.
Ky.
Va.
Va.
Md.
N. Y.
Mass
Md.
Md.
N. Y.
Vt.
N.H.
S.C.
N.C.
Md.
Conn
S.C.
Mass
N. Y.
Conn
S.C.
Va.
Del.
Conn
Mass
Go..
Va.
N.C.
Ga.

There were a total of seventy-two members during the Second
Congress.
xDesignations for this period of early party development are
taken from Stanley B. Parsons, William W. Beach, and Dan Hermann,
United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 (Westport, Conn.
Greenwood Press, 1978). Parsons uses the designations
Administration and Anti-Administration in lieu of the labels
Federalist and Democrat, which are more appropriate in later
congresses.

APPENDIX C
HOUSE MEMBERS EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS
The following House members have been excluded from analysis
due to an insufficient voting record.
Representative (N=7)

Party

State

Brown, John
Greenup, Christopher
Hindman, William
Leonard, George
Milledge, John
Orr, Alexander
Pinkney, William

A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad

Va.
Ky.
Md.
Mass
Gel.
Ky.
Md.
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APPENDIX D
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON SIX MILITIA ROLL CALLS, SECOND CONGRESS
PRO-REGULAR (N=12)
Representatives

Partv

State

Ames, Fisher
Barnwell, Robert
Benson, Egbert
Bourne, Shearjashub
Fitzsimmons, Thomas
Hartley, Thomas
Hillhouse, James
Huger, Daniel
Kittera, John
Laurance, John
Silvester, Peter
Thacher, George

Ad
Ad
Ad
Independent
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad

Mass.
S.C.
N. Y.
Mass.
Pa.
Pa.
Conn.
S.C.
Pa.
N. Y.
N. Y.
Mass.

PRO-MILITIA (N=8)
Representative

Party

State

Ashe, John Baptista
Giles, William B.
Grove, William Barry
Livermore, Samuel
Macon, Nathaniel
Parker, Josiah
Steele, John
Venable, Abraham

A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad

N.C.
Va.
N.C.
N.H.
N.C.
Va.
N.C.
Va.
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APPENDIX E
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON FIVE FRONTIER ROLL CALLS
PRO-FRONTIER(N=12)
Representative

Party

State

Ashe, John Baptista
Bourne, Shearjashub
Bourn, Benjamin
Gilman, Nicholas
Goodhue, Benjamin
Grove, William Barry
Macon, Nathaniel
Niles, Nathaniel
Steele, John
Sumter, Thomas
Thacher, George
Ward, Artemas

A-Ad
Independent
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad

N.C.
Mass.
R. I .
N.H.
Mass.
N.C.
Va.
Vt.
N.C.
S.C.
Mass.
Mass.

ANTI-FRONTIER (N=13)
Representative

Partv

State

Ames, Fisher
Barnwell, Robert
Dayton, Jonathan
Huger, Daniel
Kitchell, Aaron
Learned, Amasa
Muhlenberg, Frederick A.
Murray, William Vans
Seney, Joshua
Silvester, Peter
Smith, William L.
Sterett, Samuel
Wadsworth, Jeremiah

Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad

Mass.
S.C.
N. J.
S.C.
N. J.
Conn.
Pa.
Md.
Md.
N. Y.
S.C.
Md.
Conn.
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SECOND HOUSE:

APPENDIX F
TOTAL BUSINESS WITH BLOCS/FRINGES
(102 ROLL CALLS)

ADMINISTRATION BLOC (N=12)
Representative

Party

State

Ames, Fisher
Benson, Egbert
Boudinot, Elias
Bourne, Shearjashub
Bourn, Benjamin
Goodhue, Benjamin
Gordon, James
Hillhouse, James
Leonard, George
Sedgwick, Theodore
Jeremiah
Ward, Artemas

Ad
Ad
Ad
Independent
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad

Mass.
N. Y.
N. J.
Mass.
R, I .
Mass.
N. Y.
Conn.
Mass.
Mass.Wadsworth
Conn.
Mass.

FRINGE MEMBERS OF ADMINISTRATION BLOC
ON 102 ROLL CALLS
Representative (N=13)

Partv

State

Barnwell, Robert
Dayton, Jonathan
Fitzsimmons, Thomas
Gerry, Elbridge
Gilman, Nicholas
Hartley, Thomas
Kittera, John
Laurance, John
Livermore, Samuel
Silvester, Peter
Smith, William Loughton
Thacher, George
Vining, John

Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad
Ad

S.C.
Pa.
Pa.
Mass.
N.H.
Pa.
Pa.
N.Y.
N.H.
N.Y.
S.C.
Mass.
Del.
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ANTI-ADMINISTRATION BLOC MEMBERS
ON 102 ROLL CALLS
Representative (N=13)

Party

State

Ashe, John Baptista
Baldwin, Abraham
Brown, John
Findley, William
Giles, William
Griffin, Samuel
Lee, Richard Bland
Madison, James
Moore, Andrew
Page, John
Parker, Josiah
Seney, Joshua
Venable, Abraham

A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad

N.C.
Ga .
Va.
Pa.
Va.
Va.
Va.
Va.
Va.
Va.
Va.
Md.
Va.

FRINGE MEMBERS OF ANTI-ADMINISTRATION BLOC
ON 102 ROLL CALLS
Representative (N=10)

Party

State

Greenup, Christopher
Gregg, Andrew
Grove, William Barry
Hiester, Daniel
Macon, Nathaniel
Mercer, John Francis
Tredwell, Thomas
Williamson, Hugh
White Alexander
Willis, Francis

A-Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad
Ad
A-Ad
A-Ad

Ky.
Pa.
N.C.
Pa.
N.C.
Md.
N. Y.
N.C.
Va.
Go..
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